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CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA: BUILDING A BRIDGE ON THE 
SILK ROAD NOT DETOURED BY LABOR STANDARD 
PROVISIONS 
Ronald C. Brown† 
Abstract:  It is time for European Union and Chinese leaders to build on the 
existing EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, quickly conclude on-going 
negotiations on their EU-China Bilateral Investment Treaty, and begin substantive 
negotiations on an EU-China Free Trade Agreement? China is now the European Union's 
second-biggest trading partner behind the United States, and the European Union is 
China's biggest trading partner. China is reaching to become the leader in globalism and 
is investing heavily to make it happen. One of the world’s largest projects, the Belt and 
Road Initiative is a primary driver of China's larger development strategy. A key aim of 
the BRI is to promote economic connectivity among countries in Eurasia by recreating 
the historic Silk Road along several land corridors and sea routes. While the parts of the 
project fit together like a giant jigsaw puzzle, one of the most important corridors is the 
road between the European Union and China where China is the European Union's 
biggest source of imports and its second-biggest export market. China is motivated to 
address historic obstacles and seize the opportunities for growth. At the same time, China 
can develop its own mega-regional free trade agreement as other such agreements grow 
around them, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, while China’s 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and European Union’s Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership languish. China’s first step might be an EU-China free 
trade agreement setting standards among the European Union’s 28 countries and China 
and paving the Silk road with a model for the 68 countries touched by the BRI 
encompassing about two-thirds of the world's population and 40% of global GDP. This 
paper will compare and discuss the possible accommodations necessary to reconcile the 
different approaches in free trade agreements by the European Union and China, with a 
focus on labor standards and dispute resolution provisions in their existing free trade 
agreements, in the context of current global obligations, including the International 
Labour Organisation, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and 
others. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Background In 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the
European Union and China to “actively explore” a bilateral free trade 
agreement: 
“Together we make up one-third of the global economy. We 
must actively explore the possibility of a free trade area and the 
goal of bringing [annual] bilateral trade to one trillion dollars 
by 2020. . . . We must work to make China and the EU the twin 
engines for global economic growth.”1 
There are many reasons and opportunities why they should 
contemplate an EU-China Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”) at this time. 
Against a background in which the United States is increasingly 
drawing into question its commitments to free trade and the 
global commons, and with the uncertainty resulting from 
Brexit, there clearly exists a need for China and the EU not only 
to increase the breadth and depth of their cooperation, but also 
to act more strategically in the way they relate to each other.2 
There is increasing common interest and cooperation between the 
European Union and China. European Council President, Donald Tusk, has 
called for reform of the World Trade Organization, including new rules on 
industrial subsidies and intellectual property rights, as Europe tries to form a 
1  Shawn Donnan & Andrew Byrne, China Courts EU on Bilateral Trade Agreement, FIN. TIMES 
(April 1, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/77dc2efc-b9b4-11e3-a3ef-00144feabdc0. See generally 
Theresa Fallon, China's Pivot to Europe, 36 AM. FOREIGN POL’Y INT. 175 (2014) (The author urges caution 
on understanding the many implications of such treaty arrangements). 
2  ALICIA GARCÍA-HERRERO ET AL., EU-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS TO 2025: BUILDING A 
COMMON FUTURE iv (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2017). Britain (which may exit the EU 
under its Brexit plan) and China are also discussing trade agreements. “Speaking to reporters in Beijing 
after meeting British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the two 
countries agreed to increase trade and investment. Hunt said Wang made an offer ‘to open discussions 
about a possible free-trade deal between Britain and China post Brexit.’” China Open to Talks on Free-
Trade Deal with Post-Brexit Britain, Visiting Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt Says, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (July 30, 2018), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2157389/free-trade-
agenda-britains-new-foreign-minister-trip. See also ALICIA GARCIA-HERRERO & JIANWEI XU, WHAT 
CONSEQUENCES WOULD A POST-BREXIT CHINA-UK TRADE DEAL HAVE FOR THE EU?, (Bruegel, 2016), 
https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/PC_18_16-1.pdf. 
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common front with China against Washington’s trade tariffs.3 Perhaps it is 
time for the European Union and China to build on the existing EU-China 
2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, quickly conclude on-going 
negotiations on their EU-China Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”), and 
initiate and expedite formal substantive negotiations on an EU-China FTA. 
China is now the European Union's second-biggest trading partner behind 
the United States, and the European Union is China's biggest trading partner. 
The resulting FTA could enhance trade opportunities and contribute to 
China’s employment opportunities and rising labor standards.4 
There are recent precedents indicating China is open to substantive 
labor provisions in its FTAs and these provisions will not be an obstacle to 
completing an EU-China FTA. 
After four years of negotiations, Switzerland has become the 
second European country [and first with labor provisions] to 
sign a free trade agreement with China. The importance of the 
FTA rests in the fact that China regards it as a significant trial 
run for further FTAs with industrialized countries and the 
European Union. . . . Right from the start, the Non-
governmental Organizations and the trade unions successfully 
committed the Swiss negotiating party to the inclusion of a 
“durability chapter” in this FTA, which emphasizes human 
rights and labor rights as well as environmental standards.5 
China is striving to become the leader in globalism6 and is investing 
heavily in making it happen. One of the world’s largest projects, the Belt and 
3  Lucy Hornby, Tusk Calls for WTO Reform: Europe Seeks Common Front with China Against 
Tariff Threat, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/e683392c-88b8-11e8-bf9e-
8771d5404543. 
4  James Harrison et al., Governing Labor Standards through Free Trade Agreements: Limits of the 
European Union's Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters, 57 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 260, 262 
(2019), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jcms.12715 (studying “EU bilateral trade 
agreements in force prior to 2010, [and] concluding that those ‘with labor provisions have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on workers’ rights in signatory nations.’”). 
5  Vasco Pedrina & Zoltan Doka, Switzerland-China Free Trade Agreement and Labor Rights, 
GLOBAL LABOUR COLUMN (Oct. 2014), http://column.global-labour-university.org/2014/10/switzerland-
china-free-trade-agreement.html (footnote omitted). 
6  See Ronald C. Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements? Chinese Style Global 
Trade: New Rules, No Labor Protections, 35 PAC. BASIN L. J. 1, 5 (2017). 
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Road Initiative (“BRI”),7 is a primary driver of China's development 
strategy. A key aim of the BRI is to promote economic connectivity among 
countries in Eurasia by recreating the historic Silk Road by land and sea 
routes along several corridors. The land corridors include “roads, railways, 
bridges, power plants—anything that makes it easier for Europe, Asia, and 
Africa to trade goods with China.”8 The BRI’s sea route is “a chain of 
seaports from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean that direct maritime 
trade to and from China.”9 
While the parts of the project fit like a giant jigsaw puzzle, one of the 
most important corridors is the road between the EU and China—which has 
aided China as the European Union's biggest source of imports and second-
biggest export market.10 
While China's Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(“RCEP”) and the European Union's Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (“TTIP”) languish, other FTAs around China, such as the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
7  Full Text: Action Plan on The Belt and Road Initiative, STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/ 
publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm [https://perma.cc/N657-4LXP]. China’s State 
Council labels its “Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiatives” as the 
Belt and Road Initiative. It is explained as follows: “The Belt and Road run through the continents of Asia, 
Europe and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and developed European 
economic circle at the other, and encompassing countries with huge potential for economic development. 
The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the 
Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West 
Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the 
other.” Id. See also Xi Jinping, President of People’s Republic of China, Work Together to Build the Silk 
Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (May 14, 2017), in Full Text of President 
Xi's Speech at Opening of Belt and Road Forum, XINHUA (May 14, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/ 
english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm. 
8  Sam Ellis, China’s Trillion-Dollar Plan to Dominate Global Trade, VOX (April 6, 2018, 2:45 
PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/6/17206230/china-trade-belt-road-economy (including a video visually 
describing the BRI. A negative aspect of China’s development can occur where China’s loans to finance 
the roads, e.g., in Sri Lanka, cannot be repaid, and China assumes control over property and key ports in the 
affected country). 
9  Id. 
10  Countries and Regions: China, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Aug. 2, 2019), 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/ (China and Europe trade on average 
over €1 billion a day).  
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(“CPTPP”) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(“CETA”), have grown. China’s most significant step toward its own 
bilateral or eventual mega-regional FTA might be an EU-China BIT and FTA 
setting its own standards among the EU’s 28 countries and China, which 
would pave the Silk Road with a model for the other five corridors and the 
68 countries touched by the BRI encompassing about two-thirds of the 
world's population and account for more than 40% of global GDP.11 
Though there are many trade-related issues to resolve in the 
negotiation of any FTA, this article focuses on the obstacles surrounding the 
insertion of labor standards and their dispute resolution. Comparing 
provisions in China and the European Union’s existing FTAs and BITs in the 
context of the parties’ current global obligations, including to the 
International Labour Organization (“ILO”), WBO, and Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), this article questions 
whether labor provisions in BITs or FTAs will be an obstacle to reaching a 
final FTA. Following the Introduction, Part II discusses the economic 
opportunities and obstacles of an EU-China BIT and FTA and the status of 
the parties’ current trade agreements. Part III compares the parties’ 
respective approaches on labor standards and dispute resolution in FTAs and 
BITs. Part IV provides analyses on the comparisons of approaches, the 
possible influence of recent FTAs, and the possible labor provisions needing 
accommodation within international standards. Finally, Part V concludes that 
labor-standards provisions should not be an obstacle and suggests that the 
EU-China corridor of the new Silk Road could, and should, be paved with 
standards consistent with international labor standards and emanating from 
an EU-China FTA.  
II. NON-LEGAL
A. Opportunities and Obstacles for Growth and Elevated Standards
The BRI is made up of six corridors that direct trade to and from
China, and one of the most significant corridors is between China and the 
11  Charlie Campbell, China Says It's Building the New Silk Road. Here Are Five Things to Know 
Ahead of a Key Summit, TIME (May 12, 2017), http://time.com/4776845/china-xi-jinping-belt-road-
initiative-obor/. 
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European Union.12 The BRI offers the opportunity of complementary 
benefits for the European Union and China. “The EU has the potential to 
become the western ‘anchor’ of the BRI.”13 
As free traders in Washington like to point out, it matters who 
will write the rules or commerce in the 21st century. If the 
United States isn’t interested anymore, why shouldn’t the EU 
shoulder this responsibility? An EU-China free trade agreement 
might not include everything the [Trans-Pacific Partnership]14 
includes—there was a reason why China was never part of the 
TPP negotiations. But the EU could raise trade standards by 
asking China to put its money where its mouth is: the rhetoric 
coming out of Beijing in the past year has been vigorously 
globalist and pro-free trade. If Beijing wants to prove this isn’t 
just rhetoric, a free-trade agreement with Brussels holds the 
key. In return, China would receive greater access to the market 
of its largest trading partner and European recognition of its 
market economy status, which neither the EU nor the United 
States currently recognizes. This would entail compromise from 
Chinese leaders, but it would also bring benefits and these 
concessions would be made to the EU, not to China’s potential 
economic and strategic competitor, the United States.15 
Even with the growing economic integration of the European Union 
and China there is still much room for growth, especially through foreign 
12  Jonathan E. Hillman, The Rise of China-Europe Railways, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES 
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-china-europe-railways (“Just 10 years ago, regular direct 
freight services from China to Europe did not exist. Today, they connect roughly 35 Chinese cities with 34 
European cities. Rail services are considerably cheaper than air and faster than sea . . . and could provide a 
compelling middle option for more goods in the coming years. Rail’s share of cargo by value is already 
growing, increasing 144 percent during the first half of 2017, as compared to the same period in 2016. A 
study commissioned by the International Union of Railways estimates that China-Europe rail services could 
double their share of trade by volume over the next decade.”).  
13  García-Herrero et al., supra note 2, at viii–ix. 
14  The Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) was an FTA between twelve Asia-Pacific countries that 
contained strong labor provisions. Before the United States withdrew in 2017, the TPP was set to become 
the world’s largest free trade deal, covering 40 percent of the global economy. See James McBride & 
Andrew Chatzky, What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 4, 
2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp. 
15  Andrei Lungu, A New G2: China and the EU?, THE DIPLOMAT (August 17, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/a-new-g2-china-and-the-eu/. 
DECEMBER  2019 CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA 67 
direct investment (“FDI”) and services.16 “Both EU and Chinese leaders 
believe that effective rules-based multilateralism should form the core of 
global governance.”17 
The [European Union] and China have much in common. Their 
GDPs (€14.72 [$16.23] [CP1] trillion [rb2] and €9.75 [$10.75] 
trillion, respectively, in 2015) rank number two and number 
three in the world, behind the United States (€16.64 trillion). 
They are two of the most externally-integrated economies in the 
world, with annual international trade in goods and services of 
€15 trillion [$16.54 trillion] (€5 trillion [$5.51 trillion] if only 
trade external to the EU is considered) and €4.75 trillion [$5.24 
trillion], respectively, in 2015. Their annual bilateral trade in 
goods and services stood at €580 [$640] billion in 2015, with 
each being the other’s largest source of imports and second-
largest export destination. . . . [M]any areas of economic 
interaction remain under-developed, including trade in services, 
levels of foreign investment, cooperation on industrial and 
technological innovation, and financial market integration.18 
Cogent reasons exist for an EU-China FTA:19 1) the expanding trade 
potential;20 2) the growing and encroaching number of FTAs already setting 
the rules of trade (such as the CPTPP and CETA—with the RCEP and TTIP 
to follow) and the fact that the EU and China each have FTAs with some of 
16  See Countries and Regions: China, supra note 10. 
17  García-Herrero et al., supra note 2, at vi.  
18  Id. (“Chinese imports of services grew at an average annual rate of more than 25 per cent between 
2010 and 2015, and the EU’s trade surplus in services with China has been growing at an average annual 
rate of 37 per cent since 2010, reaching €11 billion in 2015. . . . Growing Chinese consumption, especially 
of services, has the potential to create new markets for European businesses, while rising Chinese 
investment in the EU, in addition to increasing EU GDP and employment, also provides Chinese 
companies with a platform to improve their global competitiveness”). 
19  JACQUES PELKMANS ET AL., CTR. FOR EUR. POL’Y STUD., TOMORROW’S SILK ROAD: ASSESSING 
AN EU-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1–4 (2018) (outlining five arguments for an EU-China FTA: 
“greater economic potential, comparative market access, mega-regionals, the link between Chinese reforms 
and exposure to foreign competition, and strategic and geo-political advantages.”). 
20  Id. at 1 (providing 2014 EU-China economic and trade indicators, including: (1) GDP: €16,556.9 
billion for the EU and €9,014.7 billion for China; (2) GDP per capita: €32,307.7 for the EU and €6,468.2 
for China; (3) total bilateral trade in goods and services: €518.8 billion; (4) FDI-EU position with China 
(2013): outward €130 billion, inward €27 billion; (5) average applied tariffs in industry: 3.8% for the EU 
and 8% for China; and, (6) average applied tariffs in agro-food: 7.2% for the EU and 13.9% for China). 
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the same countries, e.g., South Korea;21 3) China’s continual economic 
reforms can adjust to the necessary accommodations for an FTA;22 and, 4) 
the coming EU-China corridor of the BRI portends the need for some 
certainty in the EU-twenty-eight “rules of the road” in trade, including the 
related issues of labor standards.23 
Even with such cogent reasons for an FTA, many other practical 
trade-related issues need to be addressed, such as differences in systems 
(e.g., legal24 and political) and standards (e.g., labor), and consistency in law 
enforcement, not to mention substantive issues of intellectual property, 
industry topics, etc. Additional obstacles stem from China’s reportedly non-
transparent, exclusionary, and preferential trade practices.25 Prior EU-China 
disputes highlight areas that negotiators would need to address.26 
In 2016, due to China’s trading practices on dumping, the EU 
Parliament members voted against the granting of market economy status 
(“MES”) to China.27 An alliance of thirty European industrial associations, 
21  See Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6, at 8–12. See also 
Korea - Trade Agreements, EXPORT.GOV (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.export.gov/article?id=Korea-Trade-
Agreements. 
22  PELKMANS ET AL., supra note 19, at 2–3 (“The fundamental connection is the drive to stimulate 
productivity growth over a long period of time, after the current model of mass production based on low-
skilled assembly and extreme export-led growth in such products has begun to run out of steam. Higher 
productivity growth trends also require better, more and higher-quality services, both domestically and as 
crucial elements in global value chains. Opening up the Chinese economy is therefore, in the mutual 
interest of both the EU and China, and a deep partnership in the form of an ambitious FTA seems the most 
expeditious way to achieve that aim.”).  
23  See generally Mingha Zhao, The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for China-Europe 
Relations, 51 THE INT’L SPECTATOR 109, 109–18 (2016).  
24  OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON 
FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 94 (2017) (noting key areas that differ between the U.S. and China, including, 
“administrative licensing, competition policy, the treatment of [NGOs], commercial dispute resolution, 
labor laws and laws governing land use. Corruption among Chinese government officials, enabled in part 
by China’s incomplete adoption of the rule of law, is also a key concern.”). 
25  See Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6, at 17–21. 
26  See, e.g., Viktoria Dendrinou, EU Files Complaint Versus China on Raw-Material Duties, 
MARKETWATCH (July 19, 2016, 8:07 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/eu-files-complaint-vs-
china-on-raw-material-duties-2016-07-19. See also EU Imposes Anti-Dumping Duties on Chinese Steel 
Products, XINHUA (October 8, 2016, 10:20 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-
10/08/content_26988038.htm.  
27  MEPs Vote Against Market Economy Status for China, EU BUSINESS (May 13, 2016), 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/china-mes.121ag (“In a non-legislative resolution passed by 546 votes 
to 28, [the EU Parliament] said that until China fulfils the EU's five criteria for market economy status, its 
exports to the EU must be treated in a ‘non-standard’ way.”). See also What's Market Economy Status?, 
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AEGIS Europe, said the European Parliament’s signal could not be clearer: 
“a fair partnership is only possible if China plays by the rules of free and fair 
international trade, and honors its WTO obligations.”28 
Another significant issue is the European Union’s domestic political 
situation. Of the EU’s twenty-eight states, those already with “good trade 
deals” with China will be hesitant to support an EU substitute FTA (even 
though the EU may have the legal authority sign one under the Lisbon 
Treaty). Divergences among Member States’ interests are especially 
significant in the forging of the European Union’s coherent external 
strategy,29 and tensions between the European Union and its individual 
member states weaken the European Union’s overall influence. In EU-China 
relations, these inconsistencies can be exploited. 
Member States will not easily be convinced to alter their 
relationships with China; their lack of motivation thus far 
proves as much. The relationships between the Member States 
and China are almost entirely economic in nature, therefore 
only unambiguous economic incentives can coax the EU out of 
its current highly nationalized approach to China. A 
comprehensive EU-China FTA would offer these crucial 
incentives.30 
MANUFACTURERS FOR TRADE ENFORCEMENT (2016), http://www.tradeenforcement.org/market-economy-
status/ (“A ‘non-market economy’ is any foreign country that the U.S. Department of Commerce 
determines does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing structures.  When this is the case, sales 
by the exporting country do not reflect fair value . . . .”); Why Doesn't China Qualify?, MANUFACTURERS 
FOR TRADE ENFORCEMENT (2016), http://www.tradeenforcement.org/why-china-doesnt-qualify/ (“China is 
still a Non-Market Economy. While China has made a number of economic reforms in recent years, the 
Chinese economy remains fundamentally a non-market economic system dominated by the Communist 
Party and the state.”). 
28  Nick Prag, MEPs Defend EU Industry Against China's Unfair Trade Practices, EU BUSINESS 
(May 12, 2016, 10:25 PM), http://www.eubusiness.com/Members/nickprag/china-trade-mes/. 
29  See generally Jing Men, The EU and China: Mismatched Partners?, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. CHINA 
333, 336 (2012).  
30  Zachary Haver, Rebalancing EU-China Relations: The Case for an EU-China FTA, WORLD 
ECON., TRADE AND FIN. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/09/02/2017/rebalancing-
eu-china-relations-case-eu-china-fta (“In general terms, given the enormous size of the EU-China economic 
relationship, any additional trade liberalization, especially reduction in non-tariff barriers, stands to benefit 
both parties. … In negotiating as a supranational bloc, the EU-28 would have a greater degree of leverage 
to win concessions, and in turn would be able to collectively offer concessions of their own to China.”). See 
also Michael Smith, EU Diplomacy and the EU–China Strategic Relationship: Framing, Negotiation and 
Management, 29 CAMBRIDGE REV. OF INT’L AFF. 78, 80–82 (2016); Lucie Qian Xia, So Far, So Close? 
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Another political-legal issue raised by an EU-China BIT is what will be the 
legal effect on the Member States’ BITs with China? 
EU member states have since 1959 concluded 1,384 BITs with 
third countries. Regulation 1219/2012 foresees that in the long 
run all member state BITs are to be replaced by EU 
[International Investment Agreements] [(“IIAs”)] but does not 
set a specific time frame. The current EU negotiating agenda 
will replace a part of existing member states’ BITs. . . . 
However, the ultimate replacement of all existing member 
states BITs with EU agreements will take time, and the high 
number of authorizations granted shows that member states 
remain active in negotiating BITs. . . . For all of these reasons, it 
can be expected that individual EU member states will continue 
to request to negotiate new treaties with third countries.31 
It is reported that “Germany has practically stopped negotiating new 
BITs because of the transfer of competency for FDI to the level of the 
European Union.”32 More recently, the European Union’s highest court, the 
EU-China Network Diplomacy, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 17, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/so-far-so-
close-eu-china-network-diplomacy/. 
31  Stefanie Schacherer, Can EU Member States Still Negotiate BITs with Third Countries?, INT’L 
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/can-eu-member-states-
still-negotiate-bits-with-third-countries-stefanie-schacherer/ (“Since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009, foreign direct investment (FDI) falls within the common commercial policy of the 
European Union and, as such, became part of the sphere of exclusive competence of the European Union. 
The competence shift is evidenced by the negotiations of international investment agreements (IIAs) that 
the European Commission is conducting with a number of countries, including important economies, such 
as China and the United States. Against this background, third countries may be surprised when invited by 
individual EU member states to start bilateral investment treaty (BIT) negotiations. Does EU law allow 
member states to initiate BIT negotiations? Only the European Union may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts concerning areas within its exclusive competence. EU member states may only do so 
themselves if empowered by the European Union. Accordingly, it falls to the European Union to decide 
whether to empower member states to conclude international treaties in fields of exclusive EU competence. 
This ‘re-empowerment’ is usually adopted through secondary EU law (for example, EU regulations) and is 
often used to provide for transitional arrangements concerning areas over which the European Union newly 
acquired exclusive competence.”).  
32  Axel Berger, Investment Treaties and the Search for Market Access in China, INT’L INST. FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (June 26, 2013), at n.1, https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/06/26/investment-treaties-and-
the-search-for-market-access-in-china/ (“As new European investment treaties will replace existing 
member state BITs the number of German BITs will even decrease in the years to come.”). Once it enters 
into force, the new agreement will streamline the existing BITs between China and 27 of the 28 EU 
member states (all, except Ireland). Chancellor Merkel recently stated her support of an EU-China BIT. See 
China, Germany Agree to Speed Up Talks on China-EU Investment Agreement, Enrich Bilateral Ties, 
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European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), struck down an arbitration agreement 
contained within a BIT between two EU Member States, the Netherlands 
and Slovakia, holding it was inconsistent with EU law.33 Therefore, it is 
apparent the EU-China BIT will eventually displace the twenty-six existing 
bilateral agreements between China and EU Members.34 
Typical socio-economic issues are how FDI is used and the interaction 
between foreign owners and local workers. Chinese FDI and ownership in 
the European Union has raised concerns in some cases;35 however, there are 
also positive results, as illustrated by Chinese FDI in Sweden (an EU 
Member State). Chinese investment has thus far been well received in 
Sweden, where government, business, labor and interest groups, and even 
the media have lauded Chinese investments for job creation and an increase 
in the production of Swedish goods and services.36 
XINHUA (June 2, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-06/02/c_136332689.htm (“Merkel said 
Germany attaches great attention to the EU-China investment treaty, adding that the signing of the treaty 
will be a good start of negotiations on an EU-China free trade agreement.”). 
33  See Ben J. Williams, European Court of Justice Rules that Arbitration Agreement in Intra-EU 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Violates EU Law Calling into Question the Arbitrability of Energy Disputes 
Between EU Member States, KING & SPALDING LLP (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.kslaw.com/blog-
posts/european-court-of-justice-rules-that-arbitration-agreement-in-intra-eu-bilateral-investment-treaty-
violates-eu-law-calling-into-question-the-arbitrability-of-energy-disputes-between-eu-member-states 
(noting that the ramifications of this judicial decision are uncertain but likely to impact not only intra-EU 
BITs but also multilateral investment treaties involving the EU and its member states).  
34  China-EU, BILATERALS.ORG (July 2014), https://www.bilaterals.org/?-china-eu-. See also 
Schacherer, supra note 31 (“Only the European Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts 
concerning areas within its exclusive competence. EU member states may only do so themselves if 
empowered by the European Union. Accordingly, it falls to the European Union to decide whether to 
empower member states to conclude international treaties in fields of exclusive EU competence. This ‘re-
empowerment’ is usually adopted through secondary EU law (for example, EU regulations) and is often 
used to provide for transitional arrangements concerning areas over which the European Union newly 
acquired exclusive competence.”); FAQ on the EU Competences and the European Commission Powers, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/competences/faq (last updated Oct. 30, 
2019). 
35  See Factbox: Chinese Investments in German Companies, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-daimler-geely-factbox/factbox-chinese-investments-in-german-
companies-idUSKCN1GA1RO. 
36  EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA (ETNC), CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN EUROPE: A 
COUNTRY LEVEL APPROACH, 154–55 (John Seaman et al. eds., 2017) (“According to China’s ambassador 
to Sweden, Chen Yuming, investment in advanced manufacturing and technology can be linked to the 
‘Made in China 2025’ initiative. Sweden can offer products, know-how, technology and innovation in areas 
that constitute challenges for China, such as the environment and sustainable development. Here, the main 
interests of Chinese investment in Sweden correspond to investment in Western Europe, with advanced 
technology and established brands being the main interests of investment.”).  
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China’s interaction with European workers and labor unions is quickly 
increasing in scale, and by many accounts appears positive. By the end of 
2016 in Italy, “more than 260 Chinese industrial and financial companies 
had invested in around 450 Italian businesses, which in total employ more 
than 25,000 workers.”37 In Norway,38 national labor union representatives 
and some politicians initially resisted China Bluestar’s (a.k.a., ChemChina) 
acquisition of Elkem (a Norwegian silicone producer). Those resisting 
worried that a Chinese company, based in an authoritarian political system, 
would not respect the rights of Norwegian laborers. Yet, since the takeover 
was completed in 2011, Elkem’s representatives have appeared on television 
regularly praising the company’s new owners.39  
B. Pathway Agreements and Projects
The clearest pathway to a successful bilateral FTA would build on the
existing EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation that places an 
EU-China BIT40 as central to the European Union’s long-term bilateral 
relations with China.41 The BIT would accelerate the process toward an FTA 
and create a more open and transparent environment for increased flows of 
investment. It would also improve investment for European and Chinese 
37  Id. at 84. 
38  See Norway-European Union Relations, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norway%E2%80%93European_Union_relations (last visited Dec. 1, 2019); 
Konstruktionstraktorer, Grävmaskin Bulldozer, BLOGSPOT (July 29, 2015), 
http://gravmaskinbulldozer.blogspot.com/2015/07/norway-eu.html [https://perma.cc/82N6-CRJE] 
(“Although the Kingdom of Norway is not a member state of the European Union (EU), it is closely 
associated with the Union through its membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), by virtue of 
being a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), one of the historically two 
dominant western European” associations).  
39  EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA, supra note 36, at 105.  
40  See Berger, supra note 32 (the EU-China BIT has also been referred to as the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment (“CAI”) and the terms appear to have flexibility as the latter may omit some 
terms present in a BIT). For example, China has also negotiated preferential trade investment agreements 
(“PTIA”), of which four (with Pakistan, New Zealand, Peru, and ASEAN) included comprehensive rules 
on investment. The PTIA with Singapore incorporates the China-ASEAN investment agreement and the 
PTIA with Costa Rica (2010) reaffirms a previously-signed China-Costa Rica BIT (2007). The PTIA 
recently signed with Iceland follows this approach and recognizes the importance (Art. 92) of the China-
Iceland BIT from 1994). See Iuliu Winkler, EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (EU-
China CAI), EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Oct. 20, 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-
train/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-eu-china-investment-
agreement.  
41  See EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, EUROPEAN UNION (Nov. 23, 2013), 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/china/docs/eu-china_2020_strategic_agenda_en.pdf.  
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investors by creating investment rights and guaranteeing non-discrimination, 
improving transparency, and providing investment rules on environmental- 
and labor-related aspects of foreign investment, as all are potential obstacles 
to agreement of an FTA.42 
As the BIT will likely replace existing bilateral agreements between 
China and EU member states, the groundwork for an eventual EU-China 
FTA will already exist and could be integrated as was done in CETA and in 
the EU-Vietnam FTA.43 In 2013, the European Union carried out a 
“Sustainability Impact Assessment” to assess the potential economic, social, 
environmental, and human rights impact of the BIT agreement and, among a 
number of conclusions, determined that forward FDI from the European 
Union into China has a positive impact on employment and labor conditions 
in China.44 
In 2014, China, supported by the European Union, joined the U.S.-led, 
on-going negotiations towards a global Trade in Services Agreement 
(“TiSA”) that seeks to open markets and improve rules.45 
The [TiSA] is a trade agreement currently being negotiated by 
23 members of the [WTO], including the EU. Together, the 
participating countries account for 70% of world trade in 
services. TiSA is based on the WTO's General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), which involves all WTO members. 
The key provisions of the GATS—scope, definitions, market 
access, national treatment and exemptions—are also found in 
TiSA. TiSA aims at opening markets and improving rules in 
areas such as licensing, financial services, telecoms, e-
commerce, maritime transport, and professionals moving 
abroad temporarily to provide services. There is no formally set 
deadline for ending the negotiations.46 
42  Id.. See also Countries and Regions: China, supra note 10.  
43  PELKMANS ET AL., supra note 19, at 5.  
44  See Impact Assessment Report on the EU-China Investment Relations, EUROPEAN COMM’N 
 (May 23, 2013), at 45–46, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2013/swd_2013_0185_en.pdf.   
45  Trade in Services Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/ 
(last updated July 14, 2017). See also Donnan & Byrne, supra note 1. 
46  Trade in Services Agreement, supra note 45; see also Donnan & Byrne, supra note 1. See also 
Berger, supra note 32, at n. 7; THE WORLD BANK, CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND 
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And, there is a working group from high levels of both governments, 
underscoring the seriousness of the work; the EU-China Trade Project II 
(“EUCTP II”), works on the many substantive issues of an EU-China FTA 
and suggests appropriate positions and accommodations to support China's 
continued integration into the global trading system.47 EUCTP II will hold 
approximately 400 individual activities, organized under five linked 
components covering 40 technical files: (1) trade in services; (2) quality 
infrastructure and technical barriers to trade; (3) agriculture and SPS; (4) 
customs and trade related regulatory systems; and, (5) cross-cutting 
policies.48  This is the third project since 2000 that seeks to create a more 
open EU-China pathway. However, this program expands on previous 
attempts by promoting fair competition and value for consumers; facilitating 
harmonization with international standards and promoting safe products; 
improving food safety and quality; modernizing customs; and encouraging a 
more transparent legal environment with work towards transparency, good 
governance, and sustainable development.49 
C. EU and Chinese Labor Standards and Dispute Resolution
To the surprise of many, a recent study suggests that there may not be
so many differences between Chinese labor standards of workers and those 
of some EU States.50 A study of Foxconn in the Czech Republic shows that 
the practices of using temporary workers, maintaining low labor costs, and 
restricting trade unions resemble Chinese practices.51 Of course, this is a 
CREATIVE SOCIETY 389 (2013) (The report “China 2030” published by the World Bank together with the 
Development Research Center of the State Council, one of the most influential Chinese think tanks on 
economic policy issues, calls for a further liberalization of investment restrictions, and especially highlights 
the importance of market access provisions to be included in future Chinese investment treaties).  
47  See Carl Hayward, Trading Places: The EU-China Trade Project, EUROBIZ (May 30, 2014), 
https://www.eurobiz.com.cn/trading-places-eu-china-trade-project. 
48  See Project Overview, EU-China Trade Project II, EUROPEAN COMM’N, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/china/documents/news/20110324_01_en.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2019); Hayward, supra note 47. See also GARCÍA-HERRERO ET AL., supra note 2, at 59–67. 
49  See Project Overview, EU-China Trade Project II, supra note 48. 
50  Rutvica Andrijasevic, Made Within/Outside the EU: What’s the Difference?, UNI. LEICESTER SCH. 
OF BUS. BLOG (June 11, 2014), https://staffblogs.le.ac.uk/management/2014/06/11/made-withinoutside-the-
eu-whats-the-difference/. 
51  See id. (In 2015, “in the Czech Republic, the firm achieves flexibility by employing 40 percent of 
its workforce through temporary work agencies. These indirectly employed laborers—primarily EU 
migrants from Slovakia, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria—work 12-hour shifts during the peak production 
periods and are transported back to their countries of origin when work is scarce. They are hired on short-
term contracts and are given notice of their shifts a week in advance at best, but often learn if they have 
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mere snapshot and there is a much larger picture of employment profiles and 
legal standards and approaches regulating labor that show wide gulfs within 
the EU Member States and between EU Member States and China.52 A 
recent publication finds that electronics firms in Eastern European countries 
often use employment practices resembling those in mainland China—a so-
called “China-isation” of labor conditions in some EU Member States.53 
This evolution of Chinese investment in Eastern Europe has had an impact 
on working rights and conditions of European workers employed in the 
electronics sector, especially in Eastern Europe. 
Beijing was beginning to pour money and political capital into 
Eastern and Central Europe as part of a broad bid to increase its 
heft in Europe. China’s leaders see the region as potentially 
fertile ground. . . . Looking for further inroads, China started 
what came to be called the 16+1 initiative, an effort to expand 
cooperation with more than a dozen Eastern and Central 
European nations. It became a forum for China to show off 
what it could offer the region, like access to technology for a 
high-speed rail system. Mr. Xi later included Eastern and 
Central Europe in his Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious 
plan to develop economic and diplomatic ties through 
infrastructure projects around the world.54 
work on the same day. Furthermore, they are paid €2-2.5 per hour compared to directly employed workers 
who are paid €3-3.5 per hour . . . . In the Czech Republic, where trade unions are plant-based, the union 
tends to only be concerned with issues concerning directly employed workers, the majority of whom are 
Czech nationals. This de facto exclusion is done to protect the interests of the domestic workers, who 
benefit from the presence of temporary EU migrants because the latter group absorbs fluctuations in the 
demand for labor.”).  
52  See Agnès Parent-Thirion, et al., Eurofound, Sixth European Working Conditions Survey (2017); 
see also John Hurley, et al., Eurofound & European Comm’n Joint Research Ctr., European Jobs Monitor 
2019: Shifts in the Employment Structure at Regional Level (2019). 
53  European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), China-isation of Working Conditions and Workers’ 
Rights in Europe, MEDIUM (Oct. 7, 2016), https://medium.com/@ETUI_org/eletronicsineurope-
f413df96297b (listing comprehensive comparative wages and benefits for workers in the electronics 
industries in Hungary, Czechia, and Turkey, working for Foxconn, Flextronics, Nokia, and Samsung; they 
are all similarly low).  
54  David Barboza et. al., China Seeks Influence in Europe, One Business Deal at a Time, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2MmEm9w. The 16+1 format is an initiative by the People’s Republic of 
China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU member states and 5 Balkan countries: 
Albania, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. See “16+1” Summit 
Has Concluded, COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
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Notwithstanding the above regional wage disparities, the general 
wage gap between Chinese and European workforces in recent years has 
narrowed and diminished the competitive cost advantage that China has 
enjoyed in the past. To better compete, China seeks to mitigate losing its 
competitive edge due to its rising wages by developing automation and using 
robots in many economic sectors under its Made in China 2025 
robotization/digitalization initiative.55 Still, in 2017, the following was 
reported: 
China’s median net salary is now equal to parts of Europe, and 
higher than some Eastern European countries, due to its new 
minimum wage standards. Factory workers in China are earning 
more than ever as average hourly wages have gone up a 
significant 64% since 2011. The trend is expected to continue as 
salaries for both blue and white-collar workers are expected to 
grow by 7% this year alone. Wage increases are beneficial for 
Chinese workers as they rise to the level of various European 
countries. Median wages in Shanghai ($1,135) are now 
comparable to Hungary ($1,139), Prague ($1,400) and Poland 
($1,569). Yet China’s status as a global manufacturing hub—
due in most part to its cheap labor—will likely be impacted. 
The improved wages for workers may result in a loss of the 
(Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ldrhw_1/2016lj/hdxw4/t1414327.htm. Moreover, the 
China-Europe express railway route has become a key channel of land transportation in the global logistics 
market and is an important link between China and CEEC. See also “16+1” Mechanism Set to Bolster 
China-Europe Ties, COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
(Jul. 10, 2018) http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/zdogjhz_1/t1575579.htm. Guided by previous China-CEEC 
summits, the 16+1 mechanism has developed into an important channel for trans-regional cooperation and 
an eye-catching platform of open multilateral cooperation, which is widely seen as conducive to 
collaboration between China and the EU. In recent years, there has been steady growth in economic 
cooperation and trade between China and CEE countries, with two-way trade reaching $67.98 billion in 
2017, up 15.9 percent from the previous year, according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. Premier Li 
also said China expects to strive for pragmatic results in advancing China-EU bilateral investment treaty 
(“BIT”) negotiations and dealing with climate change so as to jointly uphold multilateralism, promote 
liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment and safeguard world peace, stability and 
development. Id. 
55  See Ronald C. Brown, Made in China 2025: Implications of Robotization and Digitalization on 
MNC Labor Supply Chains and Workers’ Labor Rights in China, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 186, 186 
(2017). 
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country’s competitive edge to labor pools in Eastern Europe and 
other Asian countries.56
The parity and diversity between the European Union and China 
suggest there is common ground to discuss FTA rules affecting labor issues. 
It also reinforces the need to understand the diversity of labor standards in 
China and within the EU Member States. 
Labor unions of course have much interest in international trade not 
undermining labor rights and opportunities.  In 2013, Switzerland became 
the first European economy (though not an EU Member) to sign an FTA 
with China, which contained labor provisions and demonstrates China is 
open to including such terms.57 It is reported that interesting political 
controversy accompanied the negotiation process in that the “Swiss Business 
Federation and the ‘political right’ were [anxious] to secure privileged 
access to the massive Chinese market ahead of all the competitors in the EU 
countries”58 and advocated disregarding human and labor rights to obtain 
that competitive edge.59 Ultimately, though the final agreement contains a 
weak monitoring system with no penalties the “political right” lost the 
argument to exclude labor standard protections.60 There was sentiment that 
the labor provision did not go far enough and only delivered a glass “half-
empty[.]”61 However, while Swiss labor unions initially opposed the weak 
labor standards, they later reversed their position and supported the FTA 
(even though labor accommodations were lacking) when they determined 
advantages were gained. Swiss trade unions decided that the official linkages 
under the agreement to facilitate cooperation between unions in Switzerland 
56  China’s Wages are Catching up to Europe, GLOBAL UPSIDE (Sept. 4, 2017), 
http://www.globalupside.com/chinas-wages-are-catching-up-to-europe/ (“Over the last decade, the 
European Union (EU) has taken steps to integrate this pool of cheap labor into the global workforce. 
However, as the Eastern European and Chinese workforces compete, a low-wage ceiling has formed; these 
two labor pools have come to determine the cost of low-skill labor worldwide. Despite Croatia becoming 
the newest EU member, the median net salary in Shenzhen, Beijing and Shanghai are all higher than 
Croatia.”).  
57  Pedrina & Doka, supra note 5. Iceland followed as a second European state to sign an FTA with 
China. See Europe FTAs, BILATERALS.ORG, https://www.bilaterals.org/?-europe-ftas (last updated May 
2012) (Iceland is not an EU Member but is a member of EFTA). 
58  Pedrina & Doka, supra note 5. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Id. 
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and China, as well as the opportunity to educate the companies and workers 
regarding labor standards, were worthy of their support.62 The unions 
perceived the gains as follows: 
[T]he preamble to the FTA cites the protocol of understanding
reached between Switzerland and China in 2007 on what is
termed a “human rights dialogue”. In addition, both sides
confirm their commitment to upholding the UN Charter, which
is the basis for the subsequently elaborated UN human rights
instruments. Regarding ILO core standards, both countries
commit to respecting those that have been ratified; China has
ratified only 4 (excluding the standards protecting freedom of
association and prohibiting forced labor). This is highly
problematic. However, the agreement does contain a reference
to both parties’ obligations arising from membership of the ILO
and from the major ILO declarations on labor rights and social
justice, observing all 8 core standards.63
In further support of labor cooperation, a recent joint study on 
Europe’s and China's future employment challenges by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (“CASS”) and the Directorate General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the European 
Commission concluded there is a shared need to upgrade the labor skills of 
existing workers.64 
It is also noteworthy that the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation, in its EU-China BIT negotiations, set a goal to negotiate “rules 
on environmental and labor-related aspects of foreign investment.”65 
Certainly issues of trade unions and workers’ organizational rights under the 
ILO core labor standards will need to be addressed, along with decisions 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  See CAI FANG & XAVIER PRATS MONNÉ, EUROPEAN COMM’N, NEW SKILLS FOR NEW JOBS: CHINA 
AND THE EU 25–26 (2012) (“Both China and the EU share a common aim to upskill the labor force and 
recognize that the majority of those that need upskilling are already in work. It is a challenging task to 
ensure that individuals have access to and actually take up training and that the relevant stakeholders 
understand the need to provide accessible training to existing workers.”) 
65  Countries and Regions: China, supra note 10 (emphasis added). 
DECEMBER  2019 CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA 79 
made about including those rights in a Social Dimension provision in an EU-
China FTA.66 
III. LEGAL: CURRENT LABOR OBLIGATIONS
This section will address the labor obligations, or lack thereof, China
and EU members have formed through BITs and FTAs. 
A. China
While Chinese BITs have not addressed labor concerns, several FTAs
with attached MOUs do, though the substance and enforcement are weak. 
This section will outline and analyze the current labor standard agreements 
China has made with other countries. 
1. BITs
Current China BITs,67 generally, and specifically those with EU
Member States do not contain labor protections or references to ILO 
standards.68 It is not uncommon for a BIT to precede an FTA, and BITs often 
are incorporated into later FTAs. It was recently noted that as “a precursor to 
their [FTA] negotiations, which launched in March 2013, China, Japan, and 
Korea (“CJK”) signed a trilateral investment agreement in May 2012.” 69 
The agreement aims to set the ground-work for greater 
regulatory transparency, a more predicable policy environment, 
and a liberalized investment regime in order to facilitate 
66  INT’L LABOR ORG., SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 4 (rev. ed. 2015)  (social 
dimension provisions in FTAs include ILO labor standards). 
67  See UN Investment Policy Hub: Terminology, INV. POLICY HUB, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent#iiaInnerMenu (click on drop-down 
“Terminology+” in left-hand menu) (“International investment agreements (IIAs) are divided into two 
types: (1) bilateral investment treaties and (2) treaties with investment provisions). A bilateral investment 
treaty is an agreement between two countries regarding promotion and protection of investments made by 
investors from respective countries in each other’s territory. The great majority of IIAs are BITs. 
68  See Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Nov. 2019), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf; see also UN Investment Policy 
Hub: Terminology, supra note 66. 
69  Jeffrey J. Schott & Cathleen Cimino, The China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement: 
Implications for US Policy and the US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty, TOWARD A US-CHINA 
INVESTMENT TREATY 6, 6 (Peterson Inst. Int’l Economics 2015) (ebook). 
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intraregional [FDI] (CJK Joint Study Committee 2011).70 
German Chancellor Merkel recently stated her support of an 
EU-China BIT; “Germany attaches great attention to the EU-
China investment treaty, adding that the signing of the treaty 
will be a good start of negotiations on an EU-China free trade 
agreement.”71 
The European Union, itself, has a number of BITs, none of which 
include labor provisions (though, as discussed below, several EU members’ 
agreements include labor terms). As the European Union and Chinese trade 
relationship continues to grow, it is also expected that FDI will increase for 
both parties. This will result in greater interaction with workers and foreign 
labor unions and increase the need for attention to labor issues and labor 
union cooperation.72 Meanwhile, the negotiations for an EU-China BIT 
continue.73 It will replace the twenty-six existing Bilateral Investment 
Treaties between the twenty-seven individual EU member states and China 
with a single comprehensive investment agreement.74 
70  See Agreement Among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of 
Investment, May 13, 2012, Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 
https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf. See also Significantly Enhanced 
Protection for Korean Investors Achieved Through Amendment of Korean-China Investment Protection 
and Promotion Agreement, S. KOR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (Apr. 13, 2007), 
http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=296267&srchFr=&amp%3BsrchTo=&amp%3Bsrch
Word=&amp%3BsrchTp=&amp%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_1=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_2=0&a
mp%3Bcompany_cd=&amp%3Bcompany_nm= [https://perma.cc/8SQ3-K7K4]. 
71  Talks on China-EU Investment Agreement to Speed Up, BILATERALS.ORG (June 2, 2017), 
https://www.bilaterals.org/?talks-on-china-eu-investment.  
72  EUROPEAN THINK-TANK NETWORK ON CHINA, supra note 36, at 154–55. 
73  Overview of the FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, supra note 68 (the 18th round of negotiations 
took place in Brussels on July 12–13, 2018).  
74  Id. (In 2016 the EU and China negotiators reached clear conclusions on an ambitious and 
comprehensive scope for the EU-China investment agreement and established a joint negotiating text). 
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2. FTAs75
a. Past Practice
One survey reveals that in mid-2015 “there were 13 [Chinese] FTAs,” 
of which eight lack labor protection provisions (ASEAN, Asia-Pacific, Costa 
Rica, Hong Kong, Macau, Pakistan, Singapore, and Taiwan) while five 
include labor protection standards (Chile, Iceland, New Zealand, Peru, and 
Switzerland).76 Of these latter five FTAs, substantive labor provisions can 
75  See generally Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6. See also Jay 
Chittooran, What Do Chinese Rules Mean for Worker Rights?, THIRD WAY (Apr. 14, 2015), 
https://www.thirdway.org/report/what-do-chinese-rules-mean-for-worker-rights. (Arguably, there are 16 
FTAs, as China had three other FTAs negotiated and in effect (with Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand) but 
they have not yet been notified to the WTO. None of these three contain a Social Dimension provision with 
labor protections); Free Trade Agreements (China), ASIAN REG’L INTEGRATION CTR., 
https://aric.adb.org/fta-country (the agreement with Taipei is an Economic Cooperation Agreement); 
People's Republic of China-Taipei, China Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, ASIAN REG’L 
INTEGRATION CTR., https://aric.adb.org/fta/peoples_republic_of_china-
taipeichina_economic_cooperation_framework_agreement (signed and in effect, not yet notified to WTO); 
People's Republic of China-Thailand Free Trade Agreement, ASIAN REG’L INTEGRATION CTR., 
https://aric.adb.org/fta/peoples-republic-of-china-thailand-free-trade-agreement (signed and in effect but 
not yet notified to the WTO); People's Republic of China-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, ASIAN 
REG’L INTEGRATION CTR., https://aric.adb.org/fta/peoples-republic-of-china-japan-korea-free-trade-
agreement (signed and in effect but not yet notified to the WTO); Free Trade Agreement Between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea, June 1, 
2015, China-S. Kor., Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/korea/annex/xdzw_en.pdf [hereinafter China-Korea FTA]. 
76  See China FTA Network, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enperu.shtml (many sections in Chinese only). The 13 agreements are: Asia-
Pacific Trade Agreement, Nov. 2, 2005, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/yatai/xieyiwenben_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y82T-9M2Y]; Mainland and Hong 
Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (“CEPA”), June 29, 2003, China-H.K., Hong Kong 
Special Admin. Region Trade and Indus. Dep’t, https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/files/main_e.pdf; 
Mainland and Macao Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, Dec. 18, 2014, China-Mac., Gov't of the 
Mac. Special Admin. Region Econ. Servs.,
https://www.economia.gov.mo/public/docs/CEPA_ACBLCS/index/en/main_text.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5QJB-G2F3]; Agreement On Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the People’s Republic Of China and the Association Of 
Southeast Asian Nations, Jan. 14, 2007, China-ASEAN, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/dongmeng/annex/xieyi2004en.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHG8-BQ951]; Free 
Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Chile, Nov. 18, 2005, art. 108, China-Chile, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of 
China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/chile/xieyi/freetradexieding2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9LR-ASZ2] 
[hereinafter China-Chile FTA]; People's Republic of China-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 8, 
2010, China-Costa Rica, 
Org. of Am. States Foreign Trade Info. Sys.,
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/CRI_CHN_FTA/Texts_Apr2010_e/CRI_CHN_Core_text_en.pdf?bcsi_scan
_7823DFCE46415F3E=0&bcsi_scan_filename=CRI_CHN_Core_text_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JGD-
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only be found in the Memoranda of Understanding (“MOU”), not in the 
texts of the FTAs. These provisions’ levels of protection range widely. In the 
China-Iceland FTA the parties agree to enhanced labor communication and 
cooperation.77 In other agreements, such as those with New Zealand and 
Switzerland, the parties reaffirm their obligations under the ILO, recognize 
that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or 
failing to enforce labor laws, and that it is inappropriate to set or use labor 
laws, regulations, policies and practices for trade protectionist purposes 
(though there is no enforcement mechanism).78 Thus, in essence, the parties 
agreed that they had ratified some ILO conventions and agreed to cooperate 
and consult if they disagree on their respective implementations of 
obligations. This type of provision is arguably comparable with the “soft 
law” approaches of corporate social responsibility and codes of conduct, 
where parties are under no enforceable legal obligations.79 
b. EU Member States
Currently, there are no FTAs between EU states and China.
4JAY]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of New Zealand, Apr. 7, 2008,  China-N.Z., N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAsagreements-in-force/China-FTA/NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf 
[https://perma. cc/Q8JL-GBP6] [hereinafter China-New Zealand FTA]; Free Trade Agreement Between the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, 
Nov. 24, 2006, China-Pak., United Nations Conference on Trade & Dev., 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2738 [https://perma.cc/8MEX-D6V3]; Free 
Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Singapore Trade Agreement, Oct. 28, 2008, China-Sing., Ministry of Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/ensingapore.shtml [https://perma.cc/S6EP-
6SAQ]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of Peru, Apr. 28, 2009, art. 161, China-Peru, Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic 
of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex/bilu_xdwb_en.pdf [https://perma. cc/X3PC-A244]; Cross-
Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, June 29, 2010, China-Taiwan, World Treaty Org. 
Reg'l Trade Agreements Info. Sys., https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/ECFA.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/G6ZD-VLLB]; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Government of Iceland, Apr. 15, 2013, art. 96, China-Ice., Ministry of Commerce of the 
People's Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/iceland/xieyi/2013-4-17-en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PY5F-35DA] [hereinafter China-Iceland FTA]; Free Trade Agreement Between the 
People's Republic of China and the Swiss Confederation, July 6, 2013, China-Switz., Ministry of 
Commerce of the People's Republic of China, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enswiss.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/2J4R-3YPC] [hereinafter China-Swiss FTA]. 
77  See China-Iceland FTA, supra note 76. 
78  See, e.g., China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 76. 
79  Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6, at 14–17. 
DECEMBER  2019 CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA 83 
c. Non-EU-Member States80
i) China-Switzerland FTA81
The 2013 Switzerland-China FTA contains minimal language
regarding labor standards. Chapter 13.5, Economic and Technical 
Cooperation, refers to the 2011 and the 2013 China-Swiss Memoranda of 
Understanding on Labor.82 The labor provisions in the 2013 MOU are 
summarized as follows: 
1. Source of standards:
a. Parties reaffirm the obligations of China and Switzerland
as members of the ILO, including their commitments
under the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work and its Follow-up.83
b. Parties reaffirm the obligations Ministerial Declaration of
the UN Economic and Social Council on Full
Employment and Decent Work of 2006, to recognizing
full and productive employment and decent work for all
as a key element of sustainable development.84
c. The Parties reaffirm the ILO Declaration on Social
Justice for a Fair Globalization adopted by the
International Labor Conference at its 97th session in
2008.85
2. Obligations:
a. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
trade or investment by weakening or reducing the
80  See Ronald C. Brown, Asian and U.S. Perspectives on Labor Rights under International Trade 
Agreements Compared, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF LABOUR RIGHTS 83, 96–112 (Axel Marx, Jan 
Wouters, Glenn Rayp & Laura Beke, eds., 2015) (discussing differences of approach in the use of labor 
provisions by Asian countries and many developed western countries). 
81  See China-Swiss FTA, supra note 76. 
82  See Agreement on Labour and Employment Cooperation Between the Federal Department of 
Economic Affairs, Education and Research of the Swiss Confederation and the Ministry Of Human 
Resources and Social Security of the People's Republic Of China, July 6, 2013, Swiss-China, 
ChinaGoAbroad Limited, http://files.chinagoabroad.com/Public/uploads/v2/uploaded/attachments/1402/ 
Agreement+on+Labour+and+Employment.pdf (the 2013 MOU also referenced an earlier more generally-
worded 2011 MOU). 
83  Id. art. 2(1). 
84  Id. art. 2(2). 
85  Id. art. 2(4). 
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protections afforded in domestic labor laws, regulations, 
policies and practices in China and Switzerland.86 
b. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to set or use
domestic labor laws, regulations, policies and practices
for trade protectionist purposes.87
c. The Parties will effectively enforce their respective
domestic labor laws.88
d. Article 3(2) of 2013 MOU refers to 2011 MOU
Cooperative activities that shall be conducted and may,
inter alia, be implemented through:
i. Dialogue, exchange of information and best
practices
ii. Meetings, visits, and workshops of experts
iii. Joint studies
iv. Joint initiatives in multilateral organizations
v. Cooperation projects and capacity building
e. Each Party shall appoint a coordinator as contact point
for implementation of the MOU89
3. Dispute resolution
a. “Should any issue arise over the interpretation or
application of this Agreement, a Party may request
consultations with the other Party through the contact
points. The Parties will make every effort to reach
consensus on the matter through cooperation,
consultation and dialogue.”90
b. “This Agreement shall enter into force on the sixtieth day
upon the issue of the latter notification. It shall remain in
force indefinitely unless either Party gives notification of
termination to the other Party with six months’ notice.”91
86  Id. art. 2(5). 
87  Id. art. 2(6). 
88  Id. art. 2(7). 
89  Id. art. 4(1). 
90  Id. art. 4(2). 
91  Id. art. 5. 
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ii) China-Iceland FTA92
Iceland is not technically an EU Member though it does share many
common undertakings.93 The 2013 Iceland-China FTA has no substantive 
labor standards. The only reference to labor is found in Chapter 9, Article 
96, Labor and Environment Cooperation, where the parties agree to enhance 
communication and cooperation on labor matters.94 
“1. The Parties shall enhance their communication and co-
operation on labor matters. 2. The Parties will further enhance 
communication and co-operation in accordance with the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Protection 
Cooperation between the State Environmental Protection 
Administration of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Ministry for the Environment of Iceland.”95 
92  See China-Iceland FTA, supra note 76. 
93  See Agreement on the European Economic Area, May 2, 1992, 1994 O.J. (L 1) 3 (entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1994). “The Agreement on the European Economic Area, which entered into force on 1 
January 1994, brings together the EU Member States and the three EEA EFTA States — Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway — in a single market, referred to as the ‘Internal Market.’” EEA Agreement, 
EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (EFTA), https://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement (last visited Dec. 1, 
2019). In March 2015 Iceland's government requested that “Iceland should not be regarded as a candidate 
country for EU membership.” Iceland, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/iceland_en (last updated Nov. 22, 2017). The 
Agreement includes close cooperation in areas such as research and development, education, social policy, 
the environment, consumer protection, enterprise, tourism and culture. Iceland and the EU. EEA 
Agreement, supra note 93.  
94  China-Iceland FTA supra note 76. 
95  Id. Regarding the MOU, a communication, dated 5 September 2016, was circulated at the request 
of the delegations of Iceland and China. The communication included questions to the parties and their 
answers, including one that read: “In 2005, China and Iceland have signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Environmental Protection Cooperation (MOU). In the China and Iceland FTA, both 
parties have reiterated the willingness to further promote communication and cooperation according the 
MOU. All these actions have facilitated the personnel exchanges and information communication between 
parties. China and Iceland are willing to promote the cooperation of labor and environment under the 
China-Iceland FTA, especially in the area of nature resource protection, environmental industry and 
technics, etc.” Free Trade Agreement Between Iceland and China (Goods and Services) Questions and 
Replies,  
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://docsonline.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-
DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=230995,229840,127699&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextH
ash= (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). 
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iii) China-Chile FTA96
The labor provisions are contained in a 2005 MOU, which can be seen
to be somewhat strong in substantive obligations, but very weak in 
enforcement.97 
1. Source of standards: The Parties shall carry out mutually agreed
co-operation activities, more particularly in the following
fields:
a. employment and labor policies and social dialogue,
including decent work, labor laws and labor inspection;
b. improvement of working conditions and workers
training;
c. globalization and its impact on employment, the working
environment, industrial relations and governance, social
security.98
2. Obligations: Co-operation between the Parties shall more
particularly be carried out by means of:
a. exchanges of information and expertise in the fields
covered by the Memorandum;
b. reciprocal visits of experts and delegations;
c. joint organization of seminars, workshops and meetings
for experts, regulatory authorities and other persons
concerned;
d. consultations within the framework of multilateral
discussions on employment, training, labor and social
security issues.99
96  See China-Chile FTA, supra note 76 (“The Parties shall enhance their communication and 
cooperation on labor, social security and environment through both the Memorandum of Understanding on 
Labor and Social Security Cooperation, and the Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the 
Parties.”).    
97  Memorandum of Understanding on Labour and Social Security Cooperation between the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security of The Republic of Chile, Nov. 2, 2005, China-Chile, Org. of Am. States Foreign Trade Info. Sys., 
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CHL_CHN/Negotiations/MOU_e.pdf [hereinafter China-Chile MOU on 
Labour and Social Security Cooperation]. 
98  Id. art. 1. 
99  Id. art. 2. 
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“Each of the Parties shall seek to secure the funds required to support 
co-operation activities and shall undertake the co-ordination of the 
departments responsible for the implementation of this Memorandum.”100 
3. Dispute Resolutions:
a. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect in any way the
rights and obligations of the Parties resulting from any
international legal instrument.101
iv) China-New Zealand FTA102
The labor provisions are contained in a 2008 MOU, which has good
substantive obligations but weak enforcement.103 
1. Source of Standards: “The Parties reaffirm their obligations as
members of the ILO, including their commitments under the
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and its Follow-up.”104
2. Obligations:
a. “The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to set or
use their labor laws, regulations, policies and practices
for trade protectionist purposes.”105
b. “The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing
the protections afforded in domestic labor laws,
regulations, policies and practices.”106
c. “Each Party may, as appropriate, invite the participation
of its unions and employers and/or other persons and
100  Id. art. 4. 
101  Id. art. 5 
102  China-New Zealand FTA, supra note 78, art. 177. 
103  See Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooperation, 2008, N.Z.-China, N.Z. Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs & Trade, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/FTAs-agreements-in-force/China-FTA/NZ-
China-FTA-Labour-MOU.pdf [hereinafter N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation]. The factor of an 
Asian country negotiating with a Western developed country is discussed in Brown, Asian and U.S. 
Perspectives on Labor Rights Under International Trade Agreements Compare, in Protecting Labor Rights 
in a Globalizing World, supra note 80, at 96–112. 
104  N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation, art. 1(1). 
105  Id. art. 1(3). 
106  Id. art. 1(4). 
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organizations of their countries in identifying potential 
areas for cooperation and in undertaking cooperative 
activities.”107 
d. Each of the Parties shall seek to secure the funds required
to support cooperation activities and shall undertake the
coordination for the implementation of this
Memorandum of Understanding.108
3. Dispute Resolution:
a. “Should any issue arise over the interpretation or
application of this Memorandum of Understanding, a
Party may request consultation with the other Party,
through the coordinator. The Parties will make every
effort to reach a consensus on the matter through
cooperation, consultation and dialogue.”109
v) China-Peru FTA
The labor provisions are contained in Article 161, Labor Cooperation,
of the 2009 MOU: “[t]he Parties shall enhance their communication and 
cooperation on labor, social security and environment issues through 
Memorandum of Understanding on Labor Cooperation between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Peru.”110 
B. The European Union
The European Union currently has no FTA or BIT with China, though,
as discussed above, it is negotiating with China for a BIT and planning for 
an FTA.111 The new EU-China BIT “will replace the 26 existing Bilateral 
Investment Treaties between 27 individual EU Member States and China by 
107  Id. art. 2(4). 
108  Id. art. 3(3). 
109  Id. art. 4(1). 
110  See China-Chile FTA, supra note 76. The author was unable to locate a separate Labor 
Cooperation MOU. See Trade Policy Developments: Peru-China, ORG. OF AM. STATES FOREIGN TRADE 
INFO. SYS., http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/PER_CHN/PER_CHN_e.ASP (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). The 
author was unable to locate a separate Labor Cooperation MOU for Peru-China. 
111  See also Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, supra note 68, at 9 (the 18th round of 
negotiations took place in Brussels from July 12–13, 2018). 
DECEMBER  2019 CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA 89 
one single comprehensive investment Agreement.”112 In addition to BITs 
and FTAs, the European Union also negotiates treaties called Association 
Agreements that can also contain commitments regarding labor protections, 
as discussed below. 
1. Association Agreements
The European Union has more than twenty Association Agreements
(“AA”),113 including with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.114 An AA has 
been defined as follows: 
a treaty between the European Union and a non-EU country that 
creates a framework for co-operation between them. Its legal 
basis is defined in Article 217 of the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), which provides for “an 
association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common 
action and special procedures.115 
Under treaty powers, the European Union is authorized “to conclude 
with one or more third countries or international organizations agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, 
common action and special procedure.”116 Article 217 states they are 
112  Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations, supra note 68, at 10 (in 2016 the EU and China 
negotiators reached clear conclusions on an ambitious and comprehensive scope for the EU-China 
investment agreement and established a joint negotiating text). 
113  See Association Agreements, INST. FOR GOV’T (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/association-agreements (“Association agreements 
were originally created by the EU to prepare non-member countries for accession. The very first such 
agreement was signed by Greece in 1961. But the EU has since used these agreements for far wider 
reasons, from improving trade with non-member countries such as Morocco, to developing deeper, long-
term political relations with countries who are not candidates for accession such as Ukraine.”). 
114  See Association Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, 
and Ukraine, of the Other Part, Mar. 21, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 161) 3 [hereinafter EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement]; Association Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community and their Member States, of the One Part, and Georgia, of the Other Part, June 27, 2014, 2014 
O.J. (L 261) 4 [hereinafter EU-Georgia Association Agreement]; Association Agreement Between the 
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the One Part, 
and the Republic of Moldova, of the Other Part, June 27, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 260) 4 [hereinafter EU-
Moldova Association Agreement]. 
115  Association Agreements, supra note 113. 
116  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 217, June 7, 
2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 13. 
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generally characterized by a number of principles, including “a clause on the 
respect of human rights and democratic principles.”117 
These Association Agreements are relevant in that they have labor 
standards and dispute settlement mechanisms consistent with EU FTAs. For 
example, the EU-Ukraine AA states the parties shall promote the ILO core 
labor standards, and implement ratified ILO conventions, shall not use labor 
laws for protectionist purposes, or lower labor standards for trade advantage, 
and shall enforce the labor laws.118 The dispute settlement provisions are 
like those of the EU FTAs in that they provide for consultation and use of a 
panel of experts.119 
2. BITs
Currently, the European Union does not have a BIT with China,120
though some EU members do (with labor provisions). It now appears the 
European Union itself will have the lead in negotiating external BITs.121 It 
also appears the European Union is moving toward including “better 
practices”122 into its BITs, which arguably can include labor rights.123 Since 
117  Association Agreements, supra note 113. 
118  See EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, supra note 114, art. 291(2-4). 
119  See id. art. 300(7). See also EU-Georgia Association Agreement, supra note 114, art. 378(1); EU-
Moldova Association Agreement, supra note 114, art. 242(1). 
120  The EU-China Investement Treaty, FED’N OF GERMAN INDUS. (BDI) (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://english.bdi.eu/article/news/the-eu-china-investment-treaty/. 
121  See Peter Turner & Christian Nitsch, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, EU Reveals the Future 
of BITs Between European States and the Rest of the World, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 10, 2013), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dac2e673-ce20-48c0-a589-2dd934ca190b (“When the 
Lisbon Treaty entered into force in December 2009, the European Union (EU) was granted exclusive 
competence over its member states for dealing with ‘foreign direct investment’. This competence, part of 
the EU’s common commercial policy, extended to bilateral investment treaties concluded between EU 
member states and third countries (Extra-EU BITs). At the time, there were already over 1,000 Extra-EU 
BITs in existence, whose future status required clarification. On 9 January 2013, a new European 
regulation dealing with the status of Extra-EU BITs comes into force—Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements 
for bilateral investment agreements between Member states and third countries—(the Regulation ). . . . The 
default position is that Extra-EU BITs signed prior to December 2009 will remain in force until they are 
replaced by new treaties between the EU itself and the relevant third countries (the EU BITs). Extra-EU 
BITs signed after December 2009 will need to be reviewed by the Commission in order to ensure their 
compliance with EU law.”). 
122  See Catharine Titi, International Investment Law and the European Union: Towards a New 
Generation of International Investment Agreements, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 639, 641 (2015) (“We are 
witnessing the decline of the old EU member state ‘good practices’ and the dawning of a new era, that of 
the EU’s ‘better practices.’”). The EU is moving from member-state-centric BITs to an inclusive EU-wide 
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2016, the European Union and China have indicated that their BIT “will also 
include rules on environmental and labor-related dimensions of foreign 
investment.”124 
a. EU BITs with Labor Standards
Three EU members have entered into four BITs that include labor
provisions, including Austria, which has entered into three separate BITs. 
i) Austria-Tajikistan 2010 BIT
The 2010 Austria-Tajikistan BIT’s Article 5, Investment and Labor,
includes the following provisions: 
1. The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage an investment by weakening domestic labor laws.
2. For the purposes of this Article, “labor laws” means each
Contracting Party’s statutes or regulations, that are directly
related to the following internationally recognized labor rights:
a. the right of association;
b. the right to organize and to bargain collectively;
template for BITs that will create a uniform approach to investment protection. EU members states’ 
“established BIT practice is referred to as their ‘best practices.’ Member state bilateral investment treaties, 
which are liberal instruments strongly protective of investor interests, have remained relatively unchanged 
over the years, in contrast with their North American counterparts, which have come to represent a new 
type of investment treaty, cognizant for the first time of the contracting parties’ right to regulate. With the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the exercise of the EU’s new competence over the conclusion 
of treaties covering foreign direct investment, Europe marks its distances with the old approach of the 
member states and appears eager to set its own ‘model’. While broadly in harmony with the new generation 
of North American investment treaties, the new EU policy aims to improve international investment law in 
innovative ways, targeting both substantive and procedural protections, and leading to a yet newer 
generation of international investment treaties.” Id. at 639. 
123  See id. at 643. (“[T]he EU Minimum Platform on Investment served as a basis for the negotiation 
of a number of FTAs, such as the 2008 EU–CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and 
the 2010 EU–South Korea FTA. Indeed, these treaties contain provisions on the non-lowering of 
environmental, safety, and labour standards, [and] references to the fight against corruption and the 
International Labour Organization . . .”). 
124  EU and China Agree on Scope of the Future Investment Deal, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Jan. 15, 
2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1435 (In January 2016, the EU Commission 
reported: “Meeting this week in Beijing, the EU and China negotiators reached clear conclusions on an 
ambitious and comprehensive scope of the upcoming EU-China investment agreement and moved into a 
phase of specific text-based negotiations.”). 
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c. a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or
compulsory labor;
d. labor protections for children and young people,
including a minimum age for the employment of children
and the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of
child labor;
e. acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and
health.
f. elimination of discrimination in employment and
occupation.125
The labor provisions in the Austria-Nigeria 2013 BIT126 and the 
Austria- Kyrgyz 2016 BIT127 are identical with that in the above Tajikistan 
BIT.  
ii) Belgium-Luxembourg-Montenegro 2010 BIT
Belgium and Luxembourg, both EU Members, together entered into a
BIT agreement with Montenegro,128 which also included a labor provision. 
Under Article 1(6), the agreement defined key terms: 
[t]he terms “labor legislation” shall mean legislation of the
Kingdom of Belgium, of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg or
125  See ABKOMMEN ZWISCHEN DER REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH UND DER REPUBLIK TADSCHIKISTAN ÜBER 
DIE FÖRDERUNG UND DEN SCHUTZ VON INVESTITIONEN [AGREEMENT FOR THE PROMOTION AND 
PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN] 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT III [BGBL III] No. 18/2012, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/III/2012/18/20120125 
(Austria). 
126  See Nationalrat [NR] [National Council] Gesetzgebungsperiode [GP] 24 Beilage [Blg] No. 2301, 
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/I/I_02301/index.shtml (Austria) (Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment between the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria). 
127  See ABKOMMEN ZWISCHEN DER REGIERUNG DER REPUBLIK ÖSTERREICH UND DER REGIERUNG DER 
KIRGISISCHEN REPUBLIK ÜBER DIE FÖRDERUNG UND DEN SCHUTZ VON INVESTITIONEN [AGREEMENT FOR 
THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
AUSTRIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC] BUNDESGESETZBLATT III [BGBL III] No. 
120/2017, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/eli/bgbl/III/2017/120/20170727 (Austria). 
128  See Agreement between the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, on the One Hand, and 
Montenegro, on the Other Hand, on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment, Belg.-Lux.-
Montenegro, Feb. 16, 2010, Inv. Policy Hub, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaty-files/389/download. 
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of Montenegro, or provisions thereof, that are directly related to 
the following internationally recognized labor rights: a) the 
right of association; b) the right to organize and bargain 
collectively; c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or 
compulsory labor; d) a minimum age for the employment of 
children; e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and 
health.129 
And, the following provisions under Article 6: 
1. Recognizing the right of each Contracting Party to establish
its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify
accordingly its labor legislation, each Contracting Party
shall strive to ensure that its legislation provide for labor
standards consistent with the internationally recognized
labor rights set forth in paragraph 6 of Article I and shall
strive to improve those labor standards in that light.
2. The Contracting Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to
encourage investment by relaxing domestic labor legislation.
Accordingly, each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure
that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to
waive or derogate from, such legislation as an
encouragement for the establishment, maintenance or
expansion in its territory of an investment.
3. The Contracting Parties reaffirm their obligations as
members of the International Labor Organization and their
commitments under the International Labor Organization
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and its Follow-up. The Contracting Parties shall strive to
ensure that such labor principles and the internationally
recognized labor rights set forth in paragraph 6 of Article I
are recognized and protected by domestic legislation.
4. The Contracting Parties recognize that co-operation between
them provides enhanced opportunities to improve labor
standards. Upon request by either Contracting Party, the
other Contracting Party shall accept to hold expert
129 Id. art. 1(6). 
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consultations on any matter falling under the purpose of this 
Article.130 
Interestingly, besides the recent promotion of “best practices” by the 
European Union, and the inclusion of labor provisions in the four BITs by 
Austria and Belgium-Luxembourg, it seems only the U.S. has heretofore 
included labor provisions in its BITs;131 and in that regard, the U.S. 
continues negotiations for a BIT with China that include some labor 
provisions which call for tougher standards.132 It appears the European 
Union and China in their new BIT will join the U.S., albeit with only 
consultation as its means of enforceability and not with possible sanctions as 
allowed by U.S. labor provisions. 
130 Id. art. 6. 
131  See Schott & Cimino, supra note 69, at 8. Before 2005, there was no U.S. BIT with labor 
provisions, except for those with Uruguay and Rwanda. See Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4, 2005, T.I.A.S. 06-110 1; Treaty Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, T.I.A.S. 12-101.  
132  See Ronald C. Brown, International Influences and Obligations Arising from Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITS) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and ILO Standards, in FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR 
RIGHTS IN CHINA—LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION AND CULTURAL LOGIC 169, 174–78 (Ulla Liukkunen & 
Yifeng Chen eds., 2016). The Obama administration issued a revised U.S. model BIT in early 2012. See 
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT 
TREATY (2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MODEL 
BIT]. These revisions will undoubtedly complicate ongoing discussions between the United States and 
China and other emerging markets. The major changes of the latest revision include: strong transparency 
obligations on regulations and other matters affecting investment and commitments to increase stakeholder 
and public participation; expanded labor and environmental standards with commitments not to “waive or 
derogate” from domestic labor and environmental laws, to “effectively enforce” such laws, and to 
recognize international commitments under the International Labor Organization and other multilateral 
agreements; and clarified specifications for state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and commitments not to 
impose technology transfer requirements and to encourage investor participation in the development of 
standards and regulations. See also Titi, supra note 104, at 643.  
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3. Free Trade Agreements
a. Background
The evolution of labor provisions in FTAs by the European Union has
transformed in recent years and their usefulness continues to grow, as 
discussed below.133  
FTAs are the most economically significant aspect of EU trade 
policy. They could cover as much as two thirds of EU trade if 
all current negotiations are successfully concluded. They are 
also the most important legally binding instruments that the EU 
can use in its external policy. Labor provisions within EU FTAs 
have “widened and deepened” over the past decade. This is 
linked in part to the 2007 Lisbon Treaty which accorded greater 
influence in trade policy-making to the European Parliament; an 
institution which has emphasized the labor and human rights 
dimensions of trade policy.134 
A significant point of departure for labor provisions in 
EU FTAs was the 2008 CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA). Unlike its predecessors, this agreement 
contained more references to social policy norms and core labor 
standards. It also allowed for disputes on social issues to be 
referred to independent experts, and institutionalized dialogue 
about the trade agreement within a civil society mechanism 
(CSM). Since the negotiation of the 2011 EU-Korea FTA such 
provisions have been packaged . . . in a Trade and Sustainable 
Development (TSD) chapter. TSD chapters have become an 
integral part of the EU's ‘new generation’ trade agreements. 
Such chapters were present in finalized agreements with a 
further 18 countries as of July 2017, with bold claims made 
about their efficacy. TSD chapters are meant to ensure that 
economic growth goes hand in hand with higher labor 
133  See generally  Lina Lorenzoni Escobar, Sustaintable Development and International Investment: A 
Legal Analysis of the EU’s Policy from FTAs to CETA, 136 BEITRÄGE ZUM TRANSATIONALEN 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2015).  
134  Harrison et al., supra note 4, at 260. 
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standards, making trade policy “not just about interests but also 
about values.”135 
The TSD chapters in EU FTAs have a tripartite format. First, there are 
substantive standards committing to ILO core labor standards and the 
Decent Work Agenda; second, there are obligations and procedural 
commitments relating to implementation; and third, there are institutional 
mechanisms to resolve disputes. 
All agreements since the EU-Korea FTA have a tripartite 
format. Committees of state/EU officials from the two parties 
are established to oversee the implementation of the TSD 
chapter. These are advised by a CSM that takes the form of a 
Domestic Advisory Group (DAG) including representatives of 
business, trade unions, non‐governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and occasionally academia, with the DAGs of the two 
parties meeting together on an annual basis. Finally, there is an 
expert panel that investigates complaints made by the parties 
and makes recommendations on them. The implication of the 
agreement text is that these institutions will interact to 
effectively implement the TSD chapter.136 
b. Japan, CETA, and South Korea
For purposes of comparison, the European Union’s recent FTAs with
Japan, Canada, and South Korea are discussed below. 
i) EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (FTA)
On July 17, 2018, the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement
(“EPA”, also called FTA) was signed by the parties.137 
Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that the agreement “shows 
the world the unshaken political will of Japan and the European Union to 
lead the world as the champions of free trade at a time when protectionism 
135  Id. at 261. 
136  Id. 
137  See Agreement Between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership, July 17, 
2018, 2018 O.J. (L 330) 3 [hereinafter EU-Japan EPA].  
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has spread.”138 The trade agreement is the biggest ever negotiated by the 
European Union and will create an open trade zone covering over 600 
million people. President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker 
stated:  
The document we signed today is much more than a trade 
agreement. It is of course a tool that will create opportunities 
for our companies, our workers and our citizens and that will 
boost the European and Japanese economies. But it is also a 
statement. For its content, its scope and also its timing. It is a 
statement by two likeminded partners that together represent 
nearly a third of the world's GDP and reiterate their 
commitment to uphold the highest standards in areas such as 
labor, safety, environmental or consumer protection.139 
The labor standard and dispute resolution provisions of Chapter 16 are 
highlighted below in summary form.140 
1. Source of labor standards:
a. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-up of 1998141
b. ILO Decent Work Agenda in accordance with the ILO
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of
2008142
2. Obligations:
a. the four core labor rights143
138  Hiroshi Hiyama, EU, Japan Sign Major Trade Deal in “Message Against Protectionism”, 
YAHOO! NEWS (July 17, 2018), https://sg.news.yahoo.com/eu-japan-sign-massive-trade-deal-us-puts-
062523433--finance.html (Abe continued, saying that “Japan and the EU will form a united front against a 
US threat to impose tariffs on key products such as cars.”).  
139  EU and Japan Sign Economic Partnership Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM’N (July 16, 2018), 
https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4526_en.htm.  
140  See EU-Japan EPA, supra note 117. A year earlier a summary document was sent to Member 
States and the European Parliament for information and which labor provisions mirror the 2018 final 
agreement. See also EU and Japan Sign Economic Partnership Agreement, supra note 119. 
141  See EU-Japan EPA, supra note 117, art. 16.1. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. art. 16.3(2). 
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b. Parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the
other Conventions each Party considers appropriate.144
c. shall not encourage trade or investment by relaxing or
lowering the level of protection provided by their
respective environmental or labor laws and regulations.
To that effect, the Parties shall not waive or otherwise
derogate from those laws and   regulations or fail to
effectively enforce them through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction145
d. effectively implement its law and practices146
e. not encourage trade or investment by weakening or
reducing the levels of protection in their labor law147
3. Labor Dispute Resolution
a. Disputes for labor violations: “In the event of
disagreement between the Parties on any matter
regarding the interpretation or application of this Chapter,
the Parties shall only have recourse to the procedures set
out in this Article and Article 16.18. The provisions of
this Chapter shall not be subject to dispute settlement
under Chapter 21.”148
b. Filing party: “Parties”149
c. Procedures: Joint dialogue between civil societies,
government consult, then mediation by panel of
experts150
d. Decision-Maker: Panel of Experts: “Each Party is
responsible for ensuring a balanced representation of
independent economic, social and environmental
stakeholders, including employers’ and workers’
144  Id. art. 16.3(3). 
145  Id. art. 16.2(3). 
146  Id. art. 16.3(5). 
147  Id. art. 16.3(6). 
148  Id. art. 16.17(1). 
149  Id. art. 16.3(1). 
150  Id. arts. 16.16, 16.17, & 16.18. 
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organizations and environmental groups, in the advisory 
group or groups.”151 
e. Upon determination of violation: “A Party may request in
writing consultations with the other Party on any matter
concerning the interpretation and application of this
Chapter. The Party requesting consultations shall set out
the reasons for the request, including identification of the
matter and an indication of its factual and legal basis,
specifying the relevant provisions of this Chapter.”152
f. Decision made public: “The Parties shall ensure that the
solutions reached through the consultations under this
Article will be jointly made publicly available, unless the
Parties agree otherwise.”153
g. Sanctions:  No penalty, only persuasion, not coercion.
“The Parties shall discuss actions or measures to resolve
the matter in question, taking into account the panel's
final report and its suggestions. Each Party shall inform
the other Party and its own domestic advisory group or
groups of any follow-up actions or measures no later than
three months after the date of issuance of the final report.
The follow-up actions or measures shall be monitored by
the Committee. The domestic advisory group or groups
and the Joint Dialogue may submit their observations in
this regard to the Committee.”154
ii) Canada-EU and its Member States (“CETA”)155
The labor standard and dispute resolution provisions of Chapter 23 are
highlighted below in summary form.156 
1. Source of Labor Standards:
151  Id. 16.15 (2). 
152  Id. 16.17(2). 
153  Id. art. 16.18. 
154  Id. art. 16.18(6). 
155  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Between Canada, of the One Part, and the 
European Union and its Member States, of the Other Part, Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter 
CETA]. 
156  Id. art. 23.3(1)(a)–(d). 
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a. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-up of 1998157
b. ILO Decent Work Agenda in accordance with the ILO
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization of
2008158
2. Obligations:
a. To legally protect the four core labor rights159
b. To promote the objectives of the ILO Decent Work
Agenda in accordance with the 2008 ILO Declaration on
Social Justice for a Fair Globalization:160 (a) health and
safety at work, including the prevention of occupational
injury or illness and compensation in cases of such injury
or illness; (b) establishment of acceptable minimum
employment standards for wage earners, including those
not covered by a collective agreement; and, (c) non-
discrimination in respect of working conditions,
including for migrant workers.161
c. Parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the
other Conventions that are classified as “up-to-date” by
the ILO162
d. Effectively implement its laws and practices163
e. Not encourage trade or investment by weakening or
reducing the levels of protection in their labor law164
3. Labor Dispute Resolution:
a. Disputes for labor violations: “For any dispute that arises
under this Chapter, the Parties shall only have recourse to
the rules and procedures provided in this Chapter.”165
b. Filing party: “Parties means, on the one hand, the
European Union or its Member States or the European
157  Id. art. 23.3(1). 
158  Id. art. 23.3(2). 
159  Id. art. 23.3(1)(a)–(d). 
160  Id. art. 23.3(2). 
161  Id. 
162  Id. art. 23.3(4). 
163  Id. art. 23.4(1)–(2). 
164  Id. art. 23.4(2)–(3). 
165  Id. art. 23.11(1). 
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Union and its Member States within their respective 
areas of competence as derived from the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereinafter referred to as the ‘EU 
Party’), and on the other hand, Canada.”166 
c. Procedures: Consultation between governments, then
mediation by a panel of experts [selected as part of the
FTA procedures]167
d. Decision-Maker: the terms of reference of the Panel of
Experts are as follows: “to examine, in the light of the
relevant provisions of Chapter Twenty-Three (Trade and
Labour), the matter referred to in the request for the
establishment of the Panel of Experts, and to deliver a
report, in accordance with Article 23.10 (Panel of
Experts) of Chapter Twenty-Three (Trade and Labour),
that makes recommendations for the resolution of the
matter.”168 Each Party shall convene a new or consult its
domestic labor or sustainable development advisory
groups, to seek views and advice on issues relating to this
Chapter. Those groups shall comprise independent
representative organizations of civil society in a balanced
representation of employers, unions, labor and business
organizations, as well as other relevant stakeholders as
appropriate. They may submit opinions and make
recommendations on any matter related to this Chapter
on their own initiative.169
e. Upon determination of violation: If the final report of the
Panel of Experts determines that a Party has not
conformed with its obligations under this Chapter, the
Parties shall engage in discussions and shall endeavor,
within three months of the delivery of the final report, to
identify appropriate measures or, if appropriate, to decide
upon a mutually satisfactory action plan.170
166  Id. art. 1.1. 
167  Id. arts. 23.9 & 23.10. 
168  Id. art. 23.10 (8). 
169  Id. art. 23.8 (4). 
170  Id. art. 23.10 (12). 
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f. Decision made public: Each Party shall make the final
report publicly available within 30 days of its delivery.171
g. Sanctions: No penalty, only persuasion, not coercion172
iii) The EU FTA with South Korea173
The EU-South Korea FTA has been provisionally applied since July
2011 and was formally ratified in December 2015.174 Chapter thirteen 
contains the labor standard provisions, highlighted below in summary form. 
1. Source of Labor Standards:
a. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work and its Follow-up of 1998175
b. 2006 Ministerial Declaration of the UN Economic and
Social Council on Full Employment and Decent Work176
2. Obligations:
a. to protect the four core labor rights ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-up of 1998177
b. to promote the objectives ILO Decent Work Agenda in
accordance with the ILO Declaration on Social Justice
for a Fair Globalization of 2008178
171  Id. art. 23.10 (11). 
172  Id. art. 23.11. See also id. arts. 1.1, 23.1–23.4, 23.8–23.10, & 8.1 (Treatment of Investors and 
Covered Investments). In contrast to CETA’s binding investment court system designed to protect foreign 
investors, the labor chapter’s compliance mechanism relies on a non-binding process of cooperation, dialog 
and recommendations to address labor rights violations. See Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free 
Trade Agreement (CETA), EUROPEAN COMM’N (Feb. 26, 2019), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf. 
173  Countries and Regions: South Korea, EUROPEAN COMM’N (May 7, 2019), 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/. For an assessment of that 
agreement, see generally Giovanni Gruni, Labor Standards in the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement 
Pushing Labor Standards into Global Trade Law?, 5 KOREAN J. INT’L COMP. L. 100, 100–19 (2017). 
175  EU-South Korea FTA, supra note 174, at art. 13.4(3). 
176  Id. art. 13.4(2). 
177  Id. art. 13.4(3) 
178  Id. art. 13.4(2) 
       174  Countries and Regions: South Korea, supra note 153. See Free Trade Agreement Between the 
European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Korea, of the Other Part, Sep. 
16, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 6 [hereinafter EU-South Korea FTA].   
DECEMBER  2019 CHINA-EU BIT AND FTA 103 
c. to ensure that its labor law and practices embody and
provide protection for the above [core labor]
obligations179
d. to recognize and promote the 2006 Ministerial
Declaration of the UN Economic and Social Council on
Full Employment and Decent Work180
e. parties will make continued and sustained efforts towards
ratifying the fundamental ILO Conventions as well as the
other Conventions that are classified as ‘up-to-date’ by
the ILO181
f. effectively implement its law and practices182
g. not encourage trade or investment by weakening or
reducing the levels of protection in their labor law183
3. Labor Dispute Resolution:
a. Disputes for labor violations: “For any matter arising
under this Chapter, the Parties shall only have recourse to
the procedures provided for in Articles 13.14 and
13.15”184
b. Filing Party: “Parties”185
c. Procedures: Consultation between governments, then
mediation by a panel of experts [selected as part of the
FTA procedures186
d. Decision-maker: “The Domestic Advisory Group(s)
comprise(s) independent representative organizations of
civil society in a balanced representation of environment,
labor and business organizations as well as other relevant
stakeholders.”187
e. Panel of Experts: “The experts shall be independent of,
and not be affiliated with or take instructions from, either
179  Id. art. 13.4(3). 
180  Id. art. 13.4(2) 
181  Id. art. 13.4(3). 
182  Id. art. 13.7(1). 
183  Id. art. 13.7(2). 
184  Id. art. 13.16. 
185  Id. art. 13.2(1). 
186  Id. arts. 13.4 & 13.5. 
187  Id. art. 13.12(5). 
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Party or organizations represented in the Domestic 
Advisory Group(s).”188 
f. Upon Determination of Violation: “If a Party considers
that the matter needs further discussion, that Party may
request that the Committee on Trade and Sustainable
Development be convened to consider the matter by
delivering a written request to the contact point of the
other Party.”189
g. Decision Made Public: the report of the Panel of Experts
shall be made available to the Domestic Advisory
Group(s) of the Parties.190
h. Sanctions: No penalty, only persuasion, not coercion.
“Recognizing the importance of cooperating on trade-
related aspects of social and environmental policies in
order to achieve the objectives of this Agreement.”191
4. International Standards
a. ILO
As a member of the ILO, China has ratified four of the eight core
labor conventions,192 while all EU Members have ratified all eight core labor 
conventions.193 A distinction can be made between an FTA commitment to 
honor the ILO Declaration, which incorporates all the conventions194 and 
honors specific convention (but is interpreted as providing only general 
obligations), with a non-FTA commitment. Commitments to specific 
conventions are interpreted as forming more precise obligations. 
188  Id. art. 13.15(3). 
189  Id. art. 13.14(3). 
190  Id. art. 13.15(2). 
191  Id. art. 13.11. 
192  See Ratifications for China, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0:: 
NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103404 (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). 
193  See INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED CORE LABOUR 
STANDARDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1 (2011), https://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/Final_draft_ICLS_in_the_European_Union_-_6_and_8_July_2011_2_.pdf. See also 
Ratifications by Convention, supra note 192; ILO, THE ILO AND THE EU, PARTNERS FOR DECENT WORK 
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 8 (2012), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---europe/---ro-geneva/---ilo-
brussels/documents/publication/wcms_195135.pdf.  
194  Brown, China-U.S. Implementation of ILO Standards by BITs and Pieces (FTAs), supra note 112, 
at 171–73. 
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b. OECD
The OECD consists of thirty-six member countries195 and assists these
countries to foster prosperity and fight poverty through data collection, 
review, standards setting, and agreements for cooperation, ranging from 
agriculture to taxation.196 China was invited by the OECD in 2007 as a “Key 
Partner” (not a Member) to strengthen cooperation through OECD 
"Enhanced Engagement" programs.197 As an active Key Partner, China 
participates in eleven significant OECD bodies and projects. Likewise, the 
European Union, as an organization (not a state), is not a Member; nor does 
it have the right to vote or officially take part in the adoption of legal 
instruments submitted to the Council for adoption. Nonetheless, “its 
participation goes well beyond that of an observer.”198 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (“MNCs”)199 were 
issued to guide governmental and business conduct through implementing 
195  See Member Countries, supra note 175. (member countries include Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
196  Bill Witherell, Director for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, Remarks at the CFO 
Strategies: Corporate Accountability Forum (May 17, 2004), 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/32034047.pdf (“Reflecting the great 
heterogeneity in both OECD and non-OECD countries, the new Principles retain their non-binding, 
principles-based approach, which recognizes the need to adapt implementation to varying legal, economic 
and cultural circumstances.”). See generally Organisational Structure, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/about/structure/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). The OECD uses information on various 
topics to fight poverty, help governments prosper, and prevent financial instability. The organization 
monitors the economies of member and non-member nations, and the Secretariat collects and analyzes 
information on different aspects of society. See generally What is the OECD?, CORP. FIN. INST., 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/oecd/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2019). 
197  See People's Republic of China, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/china/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). 
198  European Union and the OECD, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/eu/european-union-and-oecd.htm 
(last visited Nov. 27, 2019). 
199  See generally OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011). Beginning 
in 1976, the OECD developed working relationships with the ILO, the International Organization for 
Standardization, the World Bank, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, the UN Global 
Compact, UN Finance Initiative, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the International Coordinating 
Committee of Human Rights Institutions. See OECD, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OECD GUIDELINES 
FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 11 (2013). 
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procedures. “National Contact Points”200 hold Member states and MNCs, 
and their contractors,201 responsible to meet certain labor standards for their 
workers. Under OECD standards, Article V Employment and Industrial 
Relations states workers should have labor rights that mirror the ILO’s core 
labor rights, which also require enterprises to use “due diligence”202 in 
effectuating those rights.203 While there are numbers of successful resolution 
of labor disputes through the OECD consultation, mediation, investigation, 
and recommendation procedures, the Guidelines remain voluntary. Under 
the Guidelines, enterprises should carry out due diligence to identify, prevent 
and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts on human rights, industrial 
issues including labor standards, etc. Enterprises should also carry out “due 
diligence” in relation to their suppliers and other business relations, to seek 
to prevent or mitigate adverse impact that is directly linked to their 
operations, products or services. However, due diligence without 
consequences for failure seem ill-considered and some countries, such as 
France, have instituted legislative consequences.204 
c. WBO
The World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework (ESF)
launched on October 1, 2018 and provides detailed labor and working 
condition requirements for loan recipients, including grievance 
mechanisms.205 The 2018 Framework, which will gradually replace the 
200  See National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/mne/ncps.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).  
201  See generally OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 199, at 
35 (Chapter V. Employment and Industrial Relations). See also generally Ronald C. Brown, OECD 
National Contact Point, Denmark: Specific Instance Notified by Clean Clothes Campaign Denmark and 
Active Consumers Regarding the Activities of the PWT Group, Final Statement, 17 October 2016, 3 INT’L 
LABOR RIGHTS CASE L. 233 (2017). 
202  OECD, OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 15–19 (2018), 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf 
(outlining practical application and discussing due diligence obligation). 
203  See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, supra note 199, at 35–37. 
204  See Ronald C. Brown, Due Diligence “Hard Law” Remedies for MNC Labor Chain Workers, 22 
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 119, 120, 154 (2018). 
205  THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK 31–36 (2017), 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/837721522762050108/Environmental-and-Social-Framework.pdf 
(“Where national law restricts workers’ organizations, the project will not restrict project workers from 
developing alternative mechanisms to express their grievances and protect their rights regarding working 
conditions and terms of employment. The Borrower should not seek to influence or control these 
alternative mechanisms.”).  
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Safeguard policies, provides improved protections for the most vulnerable 
people, and for the environment. 
These requirements are applicable to China in that as of June 30, 
2018, the bank’s cumulative lending to China was nearly $62 billion for 
more than 400 projects.206 The portfolio is concentrated in environment, 
transportation, urban development, rural development, energy, water 
resources management, and human development.207 The detailed labor and 
working condition requirements cover:208 
1. Working conditions and management of worker
relationships
a. Terms and conditions of employment
b. Nondiscrimination and equal opportunity
c. Worker’s organizations
2. Protecting the workplace
a. Child labor and minimum wage
b. Forced labor
3. Grievance mechanism209
4. Occupational Health and Safety (“OHS”)
5. Contracted workers
6. Community workers
7. Primary supply workers210
206  Emel Akan, World Bank Will Cut Loans to China, Bank’s New President Says, THE EPOCH TIMES 
(Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.theepochtimes.com/world-bank-will-cut-loans-to-china-says-banks-new-
president_2875974.html. 
207  See Projects & Programs: China, THE WORLD BANK, https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-
operations/projects-list?searchTerm=china [https://perma.cc/NZE9-6VUC] (last visited Dec. 1, 2019) (the 
first twenty projects listed are those in China). 
208  See THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 205, at 32–36 (Labor and Working Conditions). Some are concerned about the efficacy of 
enforcement of these standards. 
209  See THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 205, at 34. 
210  See THE WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 205, at 31–36. See also THE WORLD BANK, ESS2: LABOUR AND WORKING CONDITIONS, 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/149761530216793411/ESF-GN2-June-2018.pdf. Public comment by the 
International Trade Union Confederation/Global Unions regarding the draft Guidance Note for ESS2: 
Labour and Working Conditions was made in December 2017, and suggested modifications were offered. 
These included, for example, adding confidentiality and anti-retaliation provisions to the grievance 
procedures.  ITUC, PUBLIC COMMENT DECEMBER 2017 BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION 
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The enforcement process over prior years seems to have been to 
improve labor systems as opposed to redressing individuals’ grievances; it is 
not yet clear whether the 2018 procedures will be different.211 
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Time for an EU-China BIT and FTA with Labor Provisions?
The current opportunities and timing for growth and mutual benefit
flowing to the European Union and China––and their workers––from a BIT 
and an FTA may have never been better geopolitically and economically. 
Developments, described above, suggest it is time to move forward and 
accelerate the commercial traffic along a key corridor of China’s Old Silk 
Road and better harness the EU-China billion dollar per day trade and its 
expanding FDI. The apparent obstacles of China’s trade practices and 
European Union’s diverse political makeup can be seen as challenges to 
overcome. Beginning with completion of the EU-China BIT or its absorption 
into an EU-China FTA, the parties with renewed efforts can reach 
accommodations on an FTA. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that 
the inclusion of labor protection provisions will not be an obstacle as the 
parties reportedly are now drafting it in their new BIT; and, their current 
labor provisions do not significantly differ. This result is also supported by a 
number of international labor obligations emanating from the ILO, OECD, 
WBO, and prior FTAs. 
Already, China is engaged in TiSA and OECD discussions dealing 
with fairness and transparency in trade. Both the European Union and China 
CONFEDERATION/GLOBAL UNIONS REGARDING THE DRAFT GUIDANCE NOTE FOR ESS2: LABOUR AND 
WORKING CONDITIONS 9, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/338031515447125004/ESFGuidanceNote 
CommentsonESS1ESS2ESS10byITUCandGlobalUnionspartnerorganizationsDec152017.pdf. 
211 There is no reported consensus yet on the effect of the new Guidance. See World Bank Leaves 
Door Open to Slavery in Paraguay, ITUC (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.ituc-csi.org/world-bank-leaves-
door-open-to (“Questions have arisen regarding WBO enforcement. The World Bank’s private lending arm 
claimed that its investment in Minerva would help improve conditions in the Chaco. However, five years 
later the problems of modern slavery and environmental destruction persist, and little progress has been 
made on supply chain responsibility. As part of the investment package, Minerva agreed to an 
“Environmental and Social Action Plan”. Among other actions, it included the undertaking of a “supply 
chain verification system” as well as of a mapping exercise to identify those regions and suppliers more 
likely to allow child and forced labor. However, the company missed the deadline to meet these 
commitments. Today, it is unclear whether the IFC is holding Minerva accountable and ensuring the 
implementation of the measures necessary to prevent forced and child labor in the beef supply chain.”). 
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have had for some years, high-level committees working on the issues of the 
FTA. Many new regional FTAs (such as CPTTP, RCEP, and TTIP) are 
raising the issue of who will write the rules of commerce for the future 
years. While differences in domestic labor standards can be described,212 it is 
argued that labor provisions in an FTA or BIT can enhance and elevate labor 
protections. At the same time, they will not thwart accommodation and 
agreement on an EU-China FTA or BIT, as for better or worse, from past 
practice, these treaties are general obligations with only dialogue and 
cooperation used for their enforcement. Additionally, some of the EU 
Members’ labor practices and standards are quite like those in parts of 
China, both positively and negatively. Other more controversial areas of 
trade could be accommodated by a gradual phase-in, such as in the recent 
EU-Japan FTA where some provisions are phased in over 15 years.213  
Comparing past BITs of China and the European Union, respectively, 
neither includes labor provisions. However, three EU Members, Austria and 
Belgium-Luxembourg (in tandem), have concluded BITs containing labor 
provisions that are quite like those in the recent EU FTAs and China’s FTA-
related MOUs regarding labor standards and dispute resolution. Currently, 
the European Union is moving toward a new protocol for BITs that include 
“best practices,” though it is not labor specific.214 Recently in CETA, the 
European Union has included investment provisions in the FTA itself.215 
212  See generally CATHERINE BARNARD, EU EMPLOYMENT LAW (4th ed. 2012) (for information 
regarding the EU). 
213  EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU-JAPAN EPA – THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE (2017), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155693.doc.pdf (stating tariffs of up to 28.9% will 
be eliminated over fifteen years). See also Jim Brunsden & Valentina Romei, Why the EU’s Agreement 
with Japan Is A Big Deal, FIN. TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/572fef42-6260-11e7-
91a7-502f7ee26895. 
214  See Titi, supra note 104, at 41 (discussing how the European Commission urged that the EU 
should follow the available “best practices” to ensure that no EU investor would be worse off than they 
would be under Member States’ BITs). 
215  See CETA, supra note 135; CETA Chapter Summaries, GLOB. AFFAIRS CAN. (July 14, 2017), 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-
aecg/chapter_summary-resume_chapitre.aspx?lang=eng#a8 (explaining how since the Lisbon Treaty the 
EU has begun negotiating EU-wide bilateral investment agreements, including in form of investment 
provisions in its free trade agreements. CETA was the first EU agreement signed by the EU containing 
investment protection provisions. CETA established a new investment court system (“ICS”)).  See also 
RODERICK EDWARD & LAURA PUCCIO, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, FROM ARBITRATION TO THE INVESTMENT 
COURT SYSTEM (ICS): THE EVOLUTION OF CETA RULES 13–28 (2017), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/607251/EPRS_IDA(2017)607251_EN.pdf 
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Eventually, as negotiators in an EU-China BIT and FTA attempt to 
reach an accommodation, including on labor provisions, China falls in the 
camp of leaving such social issues outside the commercial aspects of a trade 
agreement, such as is done with the WTO, and by Asian countries 
generally.216 This is reflected in China having no labor provisions in 8 of its 
13 FTAs.217  Of China’s five FTA-MOU agreements with labor provisions, 
two have labor standards and enforcement watered down;218 while the other 
three agreements have labor provisions like those in EU FTAs.219 So, in sum, 
both the European Union and China have labor provisions wherein they 
agree to obligations under ILO standards, agree to cooperate and consult if 
they disagree, and to use consultation as an enforcement mechanism. 
1. China
China’s use of labor protections in FTAs has varied over recent years.
While its labor provisions with Chile and Iceland are vague, where the 
parties merely agree to cooperate on mutual labor matters of interest,220 
another somewhat progressive labor provision is found in the 2008 China-
New Zealand MOU,221 where China clearly commits to ILO core labor 
standards and both parties explicitly agree to enable unions and other 
organizations to participate in identifying and undertaking cooperative 
activities. 
(discussing how concerns were raised regarding the differences between ISDS and domestic court. These 
relate both to the different treatment of foreign and domestic investors and to uncertainty regarding the 
compatibility of the ICS system with the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order). 
216  See Brown, supra note 80, at 96–112 (noting an exception when Asian countries negotiate an 
agreement with a non-Asian developed country, such as the U.S., Australia, or the EU). 
217  See Brown, A New Leader in Asian Free Trade Agreements?, supra note 6, at 14–17. 
218  China-Iceland FTA, supra note 76, art. 108 (the Iceland Agreement with China enhances labor 
communication and cooperation); see also China-Chile FTA, supra note 76 (the China-Chile FTA’s MOU 
agrees to cooperation). 
219  See N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation, supra note 103 (the New Zealand-China 
Agreement reaffirms ILO obligations and recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or 
investment by weakening or failing to enforce labor laws, and that it is or use labor laws, regulations, 
policies and practices for trade protectionist purposes. Like the EU, the enforcement mechanism is 
consultation). 
220  China-Iceland FTA, supra note 76, art. 108; see also China-Chile MOU on Labour and Social 
Security Cooperation, supra note 97; China-Chile FTA supra note 76, art. 2.  
221  See N.Z.-China MOU on Labour Cooperation, supra note 103. 
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China’s one FTA and MOU on labor with a European economy, 
Switzerland in 2013, may reflect the likely future accommodation with 
European Union in an EU-China FTA or BIT. It contains a commitment to 
the ILO Declaration and its core labor standards and, also, reaffirms the 
Social Council on Full Employment and Decent Work of 2006 and the ILO 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization.222 The Parties also 
agree to a broad range of obligations to enforce their labor laws, to not 
encourage trade by reducing labor standards, and to not use domestic labor 
laws to further trade protectionism. Issues over its implementation are to be 
resolved though cooperation, consultation, and dialogue––a dispute 
resolution scheme similarly embraced by EU FTA labor provisions. 
2. European Union
Labor provisions in the Social Dimension (Trade and Sustainable
Development (“TSD”) provisions in EU FTAs have developed and changed 
over the years. 
The 2008 CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement 
(EPA) contained more references to social policy norms and 
core labor standards than EU’s prior FTAs. It provided for labor 
issues to be referred to independent experts, and dialogue 
within a civil society mechanism (CSM) … and it embodied 
EU’s ‘new generation’ trade agreements to be found in 18 
countries by 2017, with bold claims made about their 
efficacy.223  
Typically, they include three primary provisions: first, commitments and 
obligations to labor standards tied to the ILO; second, a process to monitor 
the agreement, using cooperation, dialogue, and transparency; and thirdly, 
procedures and mechanisms for resolving labor disputes. Dispute resolution 
provisions are separate and different for labor than for trade, and since the 
EU-Korea FTA,224 all EU FTAs have that tripartite format.225 
222  See China-Swiss FTA, supra note 76. 
223  Harrison et al., supra note 4, at 261. 
224  See id. Committees of state/EU officials from the two parties are established to oversee the 
implementation of the TSD chapter. These are advised by a CSM that takes the form of a Domestic 
Advisory Group (“DAG”) including representatives of business, trade unions, NGOs, and occasionally 
academia, with the DAGs of the two parties meeting together on an annual basis. Finally, there is an expert 
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Perhaps the most comprehensive labor provisions are found in the 
2016 CETA agreement.226 The parties committed to the ILO Declaration and 
core labor standards, the Decent Work Agenda (covering health and safety 
standards), and obligated themselves to enforce ILO core labor standards 
and their labor laws, promote the Decent Work Agenda, make sustained 
efforts to ratify the ILO core labor standards and other Conventions 
classified as “up-to-date’ by the ILO, and not to reduce labor protections or 
use labor laws to encourage trade or investment. The labor dispute resolution 
process authorizes either Party to initiate the processes of consultation, to 
consult with its domestic advisory group, including labor unions, and to have 
mediation by a panel of experts. Decisions are made public and no sanctions 
or penalties are provided. This differs from U.S. FTAs, which have a unified 
dispute resolution process for trade and labor and provide for penalties for 
violations.227 
The Parties in the 2011 EU-South Korea FTA228 and the 2018 EU-
Japan FTA have labor obligations and dispute resolution procedures like 
those in CETA above.229 
panel that investigates complaints made by the parties and makes recommendations on them. The 
implication of the agreement text is that these institutions will interact to effectively implement the TSD 
chapter.  
229  See EU-Japan EPA, supra 117, art. 21. 
        225   See CETA, supra note 135. European Commission Dispute resolution for trade disputes has the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”), where rights are vested in by corporations and obligations are 
binding for states and enforceable by the investors; labor dispute resolution is left for consultation. 
Likewise, investment disputes have an enforceable remedy. See also Michele Faioli, Atlantic Transitions 
for Law and Labor: CETA First and TTIP Second?, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, GLOBAL TRADE AND 
SOCIAL RIGHTS STUDIES IN EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 71, 88 (Adalberto Perulli & Tiziano Treu 
eds., 2018).
           226  See generally CETA, supra note 135.
           227  Brown, supra note 112, at 176. This also contrasts to CETA’s binding investment court system 
designed to protect foreign investors, the labor chapter’s compliance mechanism relies on a non-binding 
process of cooperation, dialog and recommendations to address labor rights violations. See CETA, supra 
note 135, art. 8.10.
           228  For example, see discussion on South Korea in Gruni, supra note 153. A common argument is that 
the labor clause does include several innovative features which entrench the presence of labor law in 
international trade agreements.  However, the clause remains mainly about political cooperation and 
struggles to define enforceable legal obligations on states. This is so because of the exceptions in the first 
part of the clause, the vagueness of the labor rights obligations and the lack of an enforcement mechanism.
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The easiest way for the European Union and China to move forward 
on trade and investment talks is to finalize their BIT negotiations. Certainly, 
the inclusion of labor provisions should not be an obstacle as China already 
has embraced them in its FTA-MOU with Switzerland and several other 
countries. While the European Union has not yet included them solely in a 
BIT, though three Members of the European Union have included them, it 
has included them in their FTAs and both China and the European Union 
have indicated they will include labor provisions in its EU-China BIT. 
B. Significance of Labor Provisions in FTAs
There are many studies and diverse points of view on the practical
usefulness of labor provisions in trade agreements. One such study 
concluded that for EU bilateral trade agreements in force prior to 2010 those 
“with labor provisions have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
workers’ rights in signatory nations.”230 It further reported that “what causes 
this positive effect is the way state officials are educated about, and 
normalized into, upholding labor standards.”231 Swiss unions state they look 
forward to their educational interaction with Chinese employers. 
Other studies within that study challenge these conclusions. Reports 
of serious shortcomings under the labor provisions of individual FTAs, 
where individual states claimed standards were lowered, were treated as 
“window dressing, were under-funded, and were “watered-down.”232 
Interestingly, they also note the lack of enforceability is also raised as 
problematic by the other party to the EU FTAs.  “[A]t the 2017 civil society 
forum of the EU-Korea FTA some participants turned the discussion toward 
230  Harrison et al., supra note 4, at 262. See also generally Damian Raess & Dora Sari, Labor 
Provisions in Trade Agreements (LABPTA): Introducing a New Dataset, 9 GLOBAL POL’Y 451 (2018) 
(comparing types of labor provisions); Damian Raess, Andreas Dür, & Dora Sari, Protecting Labor Rights 
in Preferential Trade Agreements, 13 REV. INT’L ORG. 143 (2018).  
231  Harrison et al., supra note 4, at 262.  
232  See id. at 263. A report ultimately critical of the value of EU’s TSD provisions concluded, 
“[O]verall, we found no evidence that the existence of TSD chapters have led to improvements in labor 
standards governance in any of our case studies, nor did we find any evidence that the institutionalization 
of opportunities for learning and socialization between the parties was creating a significant prospect of 
longer‐term change . . . .” Id. at 273. Should the EU therefore seek to put more of its market power behind 
its labor governance strategy? Such an approach could in part be realized by the most common suggestion 
for reform from European interviewees involved in the labor movement; namely, increasing the 
enforceability of the TSD chapter by giving the EU the ability to withdraw preferential access to its market 
if labor standards are violated.
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inadequate protection of workers within the European Union, complicating 
the assumption that such provisions are essentially externally orientated.”233 
This could prove prescient on an EU-China FTA, as labor conditions in 
some EU Member states are not dissimilar to some areas in China. In fact, 
the European Trade Union Confederation (“ETUC”) agrees with the 
shortcoming of the lack of enforcement and urges penalties be added.234 
Of course, changes could be made to improve enforceability of the 
labor provisions, such as looking to a modified dispute system allowing 
direct access to both trade and labor issues that would allow third-parties, 
such as labor unions, direct access to dispute procedures. In addition, 
allowing penalties for violations, empowering an outside panel or court (like 
CETA Investment provisions) to decide cases, or perhaps empowering NCPs 
as in OECD to make recommendations following investigations, would 
strengthen the enforcement mechanism.235 However,  to be clear, there are 
two separate questions: 1) whether current enforcement procedures are 
sufficient and need modification; and 2) the question raised in this paper, 
whether current practices of European Union and China regarding inclusion 
of labor provisions in a BIT or FTA would be an obstacle to finding an 
accommodation so as to finalize the agreements. The conclusion is a clear––
there is no obstacle. 
C. The European Union and China: Reaching Accomodation on an EU-
China Labor Provision
Considering the European Union’s 2016 CETA and China-
Switzerland’s 2013 FTA and 2013 MOU are the most comprehensive labor 
protection treaties for each, a brief comparison shows there is much in 
233  Id. at 274. See also generally James Harrison et al., Labour Standards in EU Free Trade 
Agreements: Working Towards What End?, 5 GREAT INSIGHTS MAG. 6 (2016), https://ecdpm.org/wp-
content/uploads/Great-Insights-Vol5-Issue6-December-2016.pdf. 
234  See ETUC, ETUC ASSESSMENT ON COMMISSION’S NON PAPER ON TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (TSD) CHAPTERS IN EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (2018), 
https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-assessment-commissions-non-paper-trade-and-sustainable-
development-tsd-chapters-eu (it did so in its urging of inclusion in CETA). See also Angela Pfisterand & 
Éva Dessewffy, Labour Rights, in MAKING SENSE OF CETA 65–68 (2d ed. 2016).  
235  See Axel Marx, Franz Ebert, & Nicolas Hachez, Dispute Settlement for Labour Provisions in EU 
Free Trade Agreements, 5 POL. & GOVERNANCE 49, 52 (2017) (arguing that there is a need to rethink the 
dispute settlement mechanisms related to labor provisions if their effectiveness is to be increased). 
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common, and accommodation of an agreeable labor provision is completely 
feasible. Most of the provisions are the same, except as outlined below. 
The China-Switzerland MOU has an additional provision stating that 
labor laws will not be used for trade protectionist purposes,236 it has a 
detailed list of possible cooperative activities, and it has fewer express 
procedures for dispute resolution provisions, but likewise authorizes 
consultation for alleged violations or disagreements.237 
CETA has a more detailed step procedure within which consultation 
and mediation take place238 and it explicitly authorizes use of a domestic 
labor development advisory group that can include labor unions.239 A 
recommended decision is made by an internal panel of experts.240 There are 
no enforcement or penalty provisions. Either Party shall make the decision 
public within thirty days of its delivery.241 With such similar provisions, 
accommodation would likely only need to find the right language to express 
their common interests, already reflected in their prior agreements. 
V. CONCLUSION
The opportunity for closer economic relations between China and the
European Union is now. The reasons are economic, geopolitical, and for the 
benefit of employers and workers on both sides. The opportunity must be 
boldly seized through a negotiated BIT or its inclusion within an EU-China 
FTA. 
While both sides will have their domestic political hurdles to 
surmount, this article shows that one potential political and economic 
obstacle, labor provisions in the Social Dimension provisions, is largely non-
existent under the current practices of European Union and China.  
236 China-Swiss MOU, supra note 82, art. 2(6). 
237 Id. art. 4(2). 
238  CETA, supra note 135, arts. 23.9 & 23.10. 
239  Id. art. 23.8(4). 
240  Id. art. 23.10. 
241  Id. art. 23.10(11). 
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The EU-China BIT and FTA can pave the silk road with a model for 
others to follow. 
